What is a “Name Day”

A name day is a tradition in many countries in Europe and Latin America that consists of celebrating the day of the year associated with one’s given name.

The custom originated with the Greek Orthodox calendar of saints and Roman Catholic calendar of saints, where believers, named after a particular saint, would celebrate that saint’s feast day. In many countries, however, there is no longer any explicit connection to Christianity.^[1][2] It remains more popular in Southern and Eastern (Catholic and Orthodox) rather than in Northern (predominantly Protestant) Europe.

A name day is a tradition in many countries in Europe and Latin America that consists of celebrating the day of the year associated with one’s given name.

The custom originated with the Greek Orthodox calendar of saints and Roman Catholic calendar of saints, where believers, named after a particular saint, would celebrate that saint’s feast day. In many countries, however, there is no longer any explicit connection to Christianity.^[1][2] It remains more popular in Southern and Eastern (Catholic and Orthodox) rather than in Northern (predominantly Protestant) Europe.

Με λενε Κωνσταντια. Γιορταζω στις 26/12 και κανεις δεν με θυμαται γιατι ολοι ειναι ψιλοσουρωμενοι απο τα Χριστουγεννα. ΔΕΝ πιστευω σε προφητειες. ΔΕΝ γνωριζα καν ποτε γιορταζα,με “γιορταζα” μαζι με τους Κωνσταντινους χαχα.. Σημερα βρηκα αυτα , ψαχνοντας για τον Κωνσταντιο τον Ρωσο(γιορταζει 26/12) ΔΕΝ πιστευω στο τελος του κοσμου παρα μονον στο τελος του υπαρχοντα πολιτισμου μας,εαν αυτο το συνονθυλευμα απο σκεψεις,ιδεες και αλογιστες πραξεις μπορει να ονομαστει Πολιτισμος .Δεν πιστευω στον κοκκινο πλανητη ουτε στην αναστροφη των πολων,Θα ηθελα ομως να πιστεψω στην αναστροφη της σκεψης των περισσοτερων.

Άγιος Κωνστάντιος ο Ρώσος : Πρόκειται για Ρώσο νεομάρτυρα († 26 Δεκ. 1743, στην Κωνσταντινούπολη) που εμόνασε και στην Ι. Μονή Μεγίστης Λαύρας του Αγίου Όρους, ή για Ρώσο επίσκο- πο (†1806) κατά χειρόγραφο της Ι. Μονής Κωσταμονίτου Αγίου Όρους, που μας άφησε κάποιες προφητείες: Το διαβάσαμε από το: Άγιος Κωνστάντιος ο Ρώσος προβλέπει ισως την αρχή και το τέλος του αρμαγεδώνα με ημερομηνίες!!! http://thesecretrealtruth.blogspot.com/2012/11/blog-post_1292.html#ixzz2DdbwpvxO

ΚΕΦ. Α ΘΕΛΕΙ ΓΕΝΕΙ ΕΝΑΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΠΟΘΝΗΣΚΕΙ. ΚΕΦ. Β ΕΝΑΣ ΜΕΓΑΣ ΑΥΘΕΝΤΗΣ ΘΕΛΕΙ ΕΤΟΙΜΑΣΕΙ ΔΙΑ ΤΟΝ ΕΑΥΤΟΝ ΤΟΥ ΕΝΑ ΑΙΜΑΤΩΔΗ ΛΟΥΤΡΟΝ. ΚΕΦ. Γ ΕΝΑΣ ΜΕΓΑΛΥΤΕΡΟΣ ΜΟΝΑΡΧΗΣ ΘΕΛΕΙ ΛΥΠΗΣΕΙ ΚΑΤΑ ΠΟΛΛΑ ΤΟΝ ΕΑΥΤΟΝ ΤΟΥ. 

ΚΕΦ. Δ ΣΗΚΩΝΟΝΤΑΙ ΟΙ ΚΑΤΑΦΡΟΝΕΜΕΝΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΑΠΟΚΤΟΥΝ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙΣ. 

ΚΕΦ. Ε Ο ΦΘΟΝΟΣ ΔΕΙΚΝΥΤΑΙ ΑΠΟ ΤΟΝ ΧΡΙΣΤΙΑΝΙΣΜΟΝ. 

ΚΕΦ.ΣΤ ΔΙΑ 3 ΗΜΕΡΑΣ ΘΕΛΟΥΣΙ ΦΑΝΕΙ ΕΙΣ ΤΟΝ ΟΥΡΑΝΟΝ ΑΠΕΡΙΓΡΑΠΤΟΙ ΚΟΜΗΤΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΒΡΟΝΤΑΙ. 

ΚΕΦ. Ζ ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙ ΦΘΟΡΑ ΔΙΑ ΞΗΡΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑ ΘΑΛΑΣΣΗΣ. 

ΚΕΦ. Η ΕΙΣ ΤΑΣ 18 ΜΑΡΤΙΟΥ ΘΕΛΟΥΝ ΑΥΞΗΣΕΙ ΟΙ ΑΙΜΑΤΩΔΕΙΣ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΝΙΚΑΙ. 

ΚΕΦ. Θ ΕΙΣ ΤΑΣ 8 ΙΟΥΛΙΟΥ ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΟΥΝ ΔΥΟ ΑΝΗΚΟΥΣΤΟΙ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΙ. 

ΚΕΦ. Ι ΕΙΣ ΤΑΣ 12 ΑΥΓΟΥΣΤΟΥ, ΑΝΥΠΟΦΟΡΟΣ ΖΕΣΤΗ ΓΕΝΗΣΕΤΑΙ. 

ΚΕΦ. ΙΑ ΕΙΣ ΤΑΣ 18 ΔΕΚΕΜΒΡΙΟΥ ΧΑΝΕΤΑΙ ΤΟ ΗΜΙΣΥ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΤΗΤΟΣ*. 

ΚΕΦ. ΙΒ ΘΕΛΕΙ ΕΚΛΕΓΕΙ ΕΝΑΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΗΜΠΕΡΙΟΝ. 

Το διαβάσαμε από το: Άγιος Κωνστάντιος ο Ρώσος προβλέπει ισως την αρχή και το τέλος του αρμαγεδώνα με ημερομηνίες!!! http://thesecretrealtruth.blogspot.com/2012/11/blog-post_1292.html#ixzz2Ddc7U94z

Saint Namedays Each Month				In Greek Alphabetical Order
A – B	<		>	G – D – E – Z

GREEK NAME EQUIVALENT TO DATE MONTH Achilleus Achilles 24 APRIL Adrianos Hadrian 26 AUGUST Aemilianos Emil 18 / 8 JULY / AUGUST Agathi Agatha 5 FEBRUARY Agapi – 17 SEPTEMBER Aggelos Angelo 8 NOVEMBER Aglaia – 19 DECEMBER Agni Agnes 21 JANUARY Aikaterini Catherine 25 NOVEMBER Agathaggelos – 23 JANUARY Akilas – 14 JULY Alexandros Alexander 30 AUGUST Alexios Alex 17 MARCH Alkiviadis – 16 AUGUST Anargyros – 1 / 1 JULY / NOVEMBER Anastasia Anastazia 22 DECEMBER Anastasios – 22 / 27 JANUARY – APRIL Andreas Andrew 30 NOVEMBER Andriani Andriana 30 NOVEMBER Adrianos – 26 AUGUST Andronikos – 17 / 30 MAY / JULY Anthi – 12 /15 APRIL / DECEMBER Anthimos – 3 SEPTEMBER Antigoni Antigone 1 SEPTEMBER Anna Anna 25 / 9 JULY / DECEMBER Antonis Anthony 17 JANUARY Apollon Apollo 5 JUNE Apostolos – 30 JUNE Argyrios – 1 / 1 JULY / NOVEMBER Ariadni Ariadne 18 SEPTEMBER Artemios – 20 OCTOBER Aristeidis 13 SEPTEMBER Asklipios – 27 FEBRUARY Aspasia – 1 SEPTEMBER Athanasios – 18 JANUARY Athina Athina 1 SEPTEMBER Avgoustinos Augustine 15 JUNE Baia – 8 APRIL Balentini Valentine 14 FEBRUARY Basileios Basil 1 JANUARY Bartholomaios Bartholomew 11 JUNE Beroniki Veronica 12 JULY Biktor Victor 11 NOVEMBER Biktoria Victoria 11 NOVEMBER Blasios – 11 FEBRUARY

GREEK NAME EQUIVALENT TO DATE MONTH Gabril Gabriel 8 NOVEMBER Galini – 16 APRIL Gerasimos – 16/ 20 AUGUST / OCTOBER Georgios George 23 APRIL Glykeria – 13 MAY Grigoris Gregory 25 JANUARY Damianos Damien 1 / 1 JULY / NOVEMBER Daniil Daniel 17 DECEMBER Despoina – 15 AUGUST Dimitrios – 26 OCTOBER Dimosthenis – 10 APRIL Diomidis – 16 AUGUST Dionysos Dionysus 3 / 17 OCTOBER / DECEMBER Dorotheos – 5 JUNE Eirini Irene 5 MAY Eleni Ellen, Helen 21 MAY Elevtherios – 15 DECEMBER Elisabet Elizabeth 24 APRIL Elpida Hope 17 SEPTEMBER Emmanouil Emmanuel 26 DECEMBER Epameinondas 10 APRIL Ermioni Hermione 14 SEPTEMBER Evagellos – 25 MARCH Evanthia Eve, Eva 11 SEPTEMBER Evgenia Eugenie 24 DECEMBER Evgenios Eugene 7 MARCH Evdokia – 1 MARCH Evdoxia – 31 JANUARY Evfimia – 11 / 16 JULY / SEPTEMBER Evfrosini – 25 SEPTEMBER Evthalia – 2 MARCH Evthimios 11 / 16 JULY / SEPTEMBER Evthimios – 20 JANUARY Evlampia 10 OCTOBER Evlampios – 10 OCTOBER Evsebios – 15 / 22 FEBRUARY / JUNE Evstathios 20 SEPTEMBER Evstratios – 13 DECEMBER Evtixios – 6 / 24 APRIL / AUGUST Zaxaria Zachary 8 / 5 FEBRUARY / SEPTEMBER Zinobia 30 OCTOBER Zinon 22 JUNE Zoi Zoe 20 APRIL

Saint Namedays Each Month In Greek Alphabetical Order H – TH – I – 0 – K – L < > M – N – X – 0 – P GREEK NAME EQUIVALENT TO DATE MONTH Hlias – 20 JULY Hraklis Hercules 10 APRIL Hsaias Isaiah 9 MAY Theano – 1 SEPTEMBER Thekla – 24 SEPTEMBER Themistoklis Themistokles 21 DECEMBER Theodosia – 29 MAY Theodosios – 11 / 13 JANUARY / APRIL Theodora Theodora 11 FEBRUARY Theodoros Theodore 3 MARCH Theologos – 8 MAY Theofanis – 6 / 12 JANUARY / MARCH Theofilos – 8 JULY Thomas Thomas 22 / 4 / 6 APRIL / MAY / OCTOBER Iakovos Jacob 21 /23 MARCH / OCTOBER Iason Jason 29 APRIL Ieremias Jeremia 1 MAY Ierotheos – 4 OCTOBER Ignatios Ignatius 20 DECEMBER Iordanis Jordan 6 JANUARY Ioulia Julia 18 MAY Ioulianos Julian 21 DECEMBER Ioulitta Juliette 15 JULY Iounia June 17 MAY Isidoros Isidore 4 / 14 FEBRUARY / MAY Ioakeim Joacim 9 SEPTEMBER Ioannis John 7 JANUARY Isokratis – 10 APRIL Kalliopi – 8 JUNE Kirykos – 15 JULY Kleio Cleo 1 SEPTEMBER Kleopatra Cleopatra 1 SEPTEMBER Kosmas – 1 / 1 JULY / NOVEMBER Kyprianos – 2 OCTOBER Kyriaki – 7 JULY Kyriakos – 29 SEPTEMBER Konstantinos Constantine 21 MAY Lazaros Lazarus 7 APRIL Lampros – 15 APRIL Lavrentios Lawrence 10 AUGUST Leonidas Leonidas 15 APRIL Linos Linus 5 NOVEMBER Loukas Luke 18 OCTOBER Loukia Lucy 4 / 13 JULY / DECEMBER Loukianos Lucien 15 OCTOBER Lydia Lydia 20 MAY GREEK NAME EQUIVALENT TO DATE MONTH Magdalini Magdalene 29 / 22 APRIL / JULY Margarita Margaret 1 SEPTEMBER Maria Maria, Mary 15 / 21 AUGUST / NOVEMBER Marina Marina 17 JULY Markella – 22 JULY Markos Mark, Marcus 25 APRIL Martha Martha 4 JUNE Mathaios Matthew 16 NOVEMBER Maximos Maximus 21 JANUARY Meletios – 12 / 1 FEBRUARY / SEPTEMBER Merkourios Mercury 25 NOVEMBER Miltiadis – 10 APRIL Minas – 11 NOVEMBER Mixail Michael 8 NOVEMBER Natalia Natalie 26 AUGUST Nektarios – 9 NOVEMBER Neofytos – 21 JANUARY Nestor Nestor 27 OCTOBER Nikitas – 15 SEPTEMBER Nikiforos – 9 / 2 FEBRUARY / JUNE Nikodimos Nikodemus 14 JULY Nikolaos Nicholas 6 DECEMBER Xeni – 24 JANUARY Xenofon – 26 JANUARY Olga Olga 11 JULY Olympia – 25 JULY Orestis Orestes 10 NOVEMBER Palladios – 28 JANUARY Panagiotis – 15 AUGUST Panteleimon – 27 JULY Paraskevi – 26 JULY Parthenis – 7 FEBRUARY Pasxalis – 15 APRIL Pavlos Paul 29 JUNE Pelagia – 4 / 8 MAY / OCTOBER Periklis – 10 APRIL Petros – 29 JUNE Pigi – 20 APRIL Platon Plato 18 NOVEMBER Polikarpos – 23 FEBRUARY Polixeni – 23 SEPTEMBER Porfirios – 26 FEBRUARY Prodromos – 7 JANUARY Prokopios – 8 JULY

Saint Namedays Each Month				In Greek Alphabetical Order
S – T	<		>	F – X

GREEK NAME EQUIVALENT TO DATE MONTH Sarantis – 16 AUGUST Savvas – 5 DECEMBER Serafeim Serafim 6 / 8 / 4/ MAY / NOV / DEC Sergios – 13 / 7 MAY / OCTOBER Simeon – 3 / 1 FEBRUARY / SEPTEMBER Simon Simon 10 MAY Smaragdos – 9 MARCH Sofia Sophia, Sophie 17 SEPTEMBER Sofoklis Sophocles 10 APRIL Spiridon – 12 DECEMBER Stamatis – 3 / 16 / 8 FEB / AUGUST / NOV Stavros – 14 SEPTEMBER Stefanos Stephen 27 DECEMBER Stylianos – 26 NOVEMBER Sokratis Socrates 27 OCTOBER Sotirios – 6 AUGUST Sozon – 7 SEPTEMBER Taxiarxis – 8 NOVEMBER Tatiani – 12 JANUARY Timotheos Timothy 22 JANUARY Titos – 25 AUGUST Triantafyllos – 8 AUGUST Trifon – 1 FEBRUARY

GREEK NAME EQUIVALENT TO DATE MONTH Fanourios – 27 AUGUST Febrona – 25 JUNE Filimon – 6 / 22 JULY / NOVEMBER Filippos Philip 14 NOVEMBER Filothei – 19 FEBRUARY Foibi Phoebe 3 SEPTEMBER Fokas – 22 SEPTEMBER Foteini – 26 / 13 FEBRUARY / MARCH Fotios – 6 / 6 JANUARY / FEBRUARY Xaralampos Harold, Harry 10 FEBRUARY Xarikleia – 10 / 1 FEBRUARY / SEPTEMBER Xaritini – 5 OCTOBER Xristina Christine 24 JULY Xristodoulos – 16 / 21 MARCH / OCTOBER Xristos Christopher 25 DECEMBER Xristoforos – 9 MAY Xrysa – 25 DECEMBER Xrysafios – 25 OCTOBER Xrysanthos – 19 MARCH Xrysostomos – 27 / 13 JANUARY / NOVEMBER

Eurasian Energy Games

Source

Wednesday, November 14, 2012

BP May Open Britain to Russian Gas

Additional ramifications of the BP-Rosneft deal are now coming to light.  With the purchase of TNK-BP by Rosneft, BP’s Russian partners have agreed to end their legal battles with British Petroleum.  Sources claim that the two sides agreed to settle all their disputes after BP  made a $325 million payment to the Russian consortium AAR.  Supposedly, this move has been taken to give BP the freedom to pursue the development of Arctic oil.  “BP is not taking an equity position in Rosneft as a portfolio investor,” said chief strategist at Sberbank CIB Chris Weafer.  “they are looking at a future relationship through which they can grow production and reserves in Russia.”

It appears, however, that this deal has also cleared the boards for BP to work with Gazprom to bring Russian natural gas to Great Britain.  AAR had previously taken the position that their partnership with BP mandated all BP business opportunities in Russia be run through TNK-BP.  With all claims settled, sources report that the consortium has relinquished all claims on BP’s future Russian activities.  That could include moving into the natural gas market.  Gazprom’s  Chief Executive Alexi Miller reported in June that BP was interested in participating in an expanded Nord Stream pipeline, one that would carry product to Britain.

Such a move is a  questionable investment decision by the British company, given the plummeting price natural gas is commanding, and the large quantities of liquified natural gas (LNG) coming on the market to compete with pipeline gas.

Posted by James J. Coyle

Friday, November 2, 2012

Reprecussions from the sale of TNK-BP

With the recent decision of OAO Rosneft to purchase TNK-BP from its various owners, one of the most strained partnerships in Russian economic history comes to an end.  Rosneft has agreed to pay a total of $54.8 billion to BP plc and the Alfa-Access-Renova consortum (AAR) controlled by four Russian billionaires.  These oligarchs–Mikhail Fridman, German Khan, Viktor Vekeselberg and Len Blavatnik– defied the stated policy of the Kremlin last year to prohibit BP from entering into an artic exploration agreement with Rosneft.  With ill feelings all around, it was apparent that this business union was headed for a divorce.

Initially, AAR offered to buy BP’s 50% ownership in TNK-BP, but this offer was withdrawn when Rosneft offered to purchase AAR’s shares instead.  AAR is slated to receive $28 billion for it’s half of the company.  Rosneft then offered BP the chance to sell its shares, as well.  Anxious to raise capital to pay its Gulf spill-related expenses, BP agreed to accept $10-$15 billion in cash,and a 12.5% share in Rosneft.  BP plans to use part of the cash payment to purchase an additional 5.66% of Rosneft which, combined with the 1.5% share they already hold, will bring their share of ownership to approximately 19.75%.  75% of Rosneft is owned by the Russian state, while the remainder is sold in the market.

Analysts believe that the majority stock holder Russian state will help finance the purchase.  “For Rosneft to buy both AAR and BP to form a fully state-owned oil champion would be the cleaner solution for the Russian state, and is likely to require further state injection into Rosneft, given that the company had previously been sounding out the market for a loan to buy part of BP’s share,” said RBC Capital Markets Corporation’s Peter Hutton.  Not as much cash is required for the deal as the original figures would indicate, since BP and AAR are owed about $2.5 billion in dividends from TNK-BP.  According to journalist Paul Whitfield, this means the cash proceeds from the two deals are actually $26.75 billion for AAR and $15.85 billion for BP, falling to $11.05 billion for BP after its acquisition of Rosneft stock.

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears happy with the deal.  “This is a very good signal for the Russian market.  It is a good, large deal.  I would like to thank you for this work,” he told Rosneft CEO and longtime ally Igor Sechin.  Putin should be happy:  the deal gives Rosneft a seat on BP’s board.  This will give Russia a voice in BP operations outside of Russian territory such as in the Caspian where BP is the lead oil company.

The deal puts Rosneft ahead of Gazprom as the leading energy producer in Russia.  After the deal is consummated, Rosneft will produce 4 million barrels of crude oil a day.  This does not appear to be the result of any inside-Kremlin politics, but economics.  As the price of natural gas declines in the face of the shale revolution, it should be anticipated that Gazprom’s importance would also decline.  Moscow needs revenues, however, and the price of oil remains high.  Igor Sechin, driven out of the cabinet by former President Medvedev, is back in the cat bird seat.

Posted by James J. Coyle

Bulgaria Playing Both Sides

Against all expectations, Bulgaria has emerged as a key player in the battle for control of the Southern Energy Corridor.  This Black Sea country is astride the most logical route between the gas fields and European markets for both South Stream and TANAP.  Bulgaria has agreed to cooperate with both consortiums, while playing for maximum advantage.

In August 2012, Bulgaria and Gazprom announced they would conclude an investment contract in November for the construction of South Stream.  Simultaneously, Bulgarian Minister of Energy and Economy Delyan Dobrev announced a new gas-supply contract that featured an 11% price in gas for the remainder of 2012.

Once having achieved its goal of obtaining Bulgarian cooperation, however, the Russians appear to have upped the ante.  For construction of South Stream to begin, the Russians declared they wanted $1.3 billion in compensation for the Belene nuclear plant.  This was a project that the former Bulgarian government had contracted with Russia, but that current Prime Minister Boiko Borisov cancelled when he took office last year.  Borisov was outraged.  “We are observing all our commitments on South Stream.  For Belene we continue to negotiate…That is why I think we have been absolutely treacherously surprised by that claim.”  Bulgarian observers pushed back, threatening that the government would be forced to cancel South Stream.  Ilian Vassilev of Innovative Energy Solutions said, “There is no way Bulgaria can pay both the claim and let South Stream happen.”

The dispute has led to a delay in a visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was supposed to be present in Sofia on November 9 for the signing of the South Stream papers.  Instead, Putin has postponed his trip until December, possibly signalling his unhappiness with Bulgaria’s recalcitrance.

Meanwhile, in September 2012 the European Union criticized Bulgaria for  supporting South Stream while lacking sufficient commitment to the EU’s version of a Southern Energy Corridor.  The EU’s concern was that South Stream only diversifies supply routes from Russia, but does not diversify the ultimate, Russian source of supply.  “Bulgaria needs to complete the ongoing investment projects on gas interconnectors with Romania, Serbia and Greece, and make reverse flows possible on its interconnector with Turkey…Bulgaria also needs to play a more proactive part in opening up the Southern Gas Corridor, which has the potential to diversify supply sources,” said a leaked document.

EC Report Slams Bulgaria’s Failure to Commit to Southern Energy Corridor

Energy | September 18, 2012, Tuesday| 1215 views

Мap of the so called Southern Energy Corridor from REEE

Bulgaria must commit more thoroughly to the development of the EU-sponsored Southern Energy Corridor (also known as Southern Gas Corridor) aimed at diversifying natural gas suppliers to Europe, according to a leaked report of the European Commission.

The draft report of the EC, which is still to be released, criticizes Bulgaria for throwing its weight mostly behind the Russian-sponsored South Stream gas transit pipeline, while lacking sufficient commitment to EU’s attempts to develop the Southern Energy Corridor, EurActiv reported Tuesday citing the leaked report.

Bulgaria needs to complete the ongoing investment projects on gas interconnectors with Romania, Serbia and Greece, and make reverse flows possible on its interconnector with Turkey, the EU executive says.

“Bulgaria also needs to play a more proactive part in opening up the Southern Gas Corridor, which has the potential to diversify supply sources,” the paper reads.

The Southern Gas Corridor is a key element of competing projects to bring natural gas to Europe from the offshore Shah Deniz II field in Azerbaijan.

Up to now, Bulgaria has made commitments to South Stream, a Gazprom-favoured project widely seen as a competitor to the Southern Gas Corridor.

The South Stream pipeline is intended to transport up to 63 billion cubic meters of natural gas to central and southern Europe, diversifying Russian gas routes away from transit countries such as Ukraine.

The pipes will go from Russia to Bulgaria via the Black Sea; in Bulgaria it will split in two – with the northern leg going through Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia to Austria and Northern Italy, and the southern leg going through Greece to Southern Italy. Recent reports have indicated, however, that Russian energy giant Gazprom may give up on the construction of the offshore section of the South Stream gas pipeline to Austria.

The Black Sea underwater section of South Stream between Russia and Bulgaria will be 900 km long, and will be constructed at a maximum depth of 2 km.

The construction of the South Stream gas pipeline will begin in December 2012, and the first supplies for Europe are scheduled for December 2015.

The pipeline’s core shareholders include Gazprom with 50%, Italy’s Eni with 20% and Germany’s Wintershall Holding and France’s EDF with 15% each.

Gazprom has already established national joint ventures with companies from Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia, Greece, Hungary and Serbia to manage the onshore section of the South Stream pipeline.

Bulgaria has committed itself to speeding up the construction of the Russian-sponsored pipeline on its territory, since on January 1, 2013, the EU is introducing new requirements for the access to energy networks.

In the draft gas supply report of the EC, Bulgaria is also urged to increase cross-border network capacity.

Regardless of its more favorable geographic location, Bulgaria is also singled out as one of the energy infrastructure black spots on the EU map.

The Bulgarian Prime Minister was non-plussed.  In an interview with Euronews, Borisov said he was commited to the European vision.  “It is very important that the Turkish Tanap-pipeline reaches Bulgaria and that Nabucco-West and the South East Europe Pipeline move closer to Europe…Regarding the Nabucco project, Bulgaria has done all it can:  the parliament approved its construction.  We have signed all the documents that are required and we can start construction work tomorrow if necessary.  I am looking forward to the launch of the Nabucco project.”

Despite any agreement with Nabucco, however, as of 30 September 2012 there was no agreement between Bulgartransgaz and Turkey’s Botas to connect with the Turkish pipeline network.  Without such a connection, any discussion of Tanap or Nabucco is moot.  To give the country some negotiating room, Bularia delayed its plans one year to connect its gas network with neighboring Balkan countries.  Bulgartransgaz announced the connection would take place in 2014, instead of the originally-planned 2013.

Posted by James J. Coyle

Wednesday, September 5, 2012

Transcaspian Back on the Board

Recent armed spats between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in the Caspian Sea placed the future of the Trans Caspian Pipeline in doubt, but European Union-backed talks in Ashkabat appear to have put things back on track.  According to EU spokeswoman Marlene Holzner, the Turkmenistan Energy Minister Myrat Artykow and Azerbaijan Minister for Industry and Energy agreed with EU Energy Commissioner Gunther Oettinger that the project could be an important part of efforts to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas supplies.
Holzner said both Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan had expressed a desire to supply Turkmen gas to Europe, but neither country was willing to make any firm commitments.  “Turkmenistan said it continues to be interested in delivering gas to Europe.  Azerbaijan also confirmed its interest in being an ‘enabler’, meaning it would also be a transit country for gas.”

Despite the expressions of good intentions, who moves first to make the pipeline a reality remains in doubt.  Holzner said that the EU was waiting for a gurantee from Turkmenistan on supply (despite the fact that Turkmenistan President Gurbangulu Berdimuhammedov is on record as promising 40 bcm per year for the project).  At the same time, she said that the EU would neither own the pipeline nor pay for it.  For his part, Berdimuhammedov has previously said that while he would sell the gas to Europe, it would be up to the Europeans to figure how to get it from Turkmenistan.  So, all good wishes aside, no progress appears to have been made other than to get the parties talking again.

Turkmenistan appears to have turned its attention east, with most of its gas sales going by pipeline to China.  For Azerbaijan’s part, the pipeline could be seen as either competition for its own future gas production, or for Gazprom’s South Stream.  In either case, the benefits of a Trans Caspian Pipeline do not appear to be overwhelming.  The one country that would benefit is Turkey, who would like to see Turkmen gas made available to expand the proposed TANAP pipeline.

“With the TANAP project we have created a structure that will allow gas to transit across Azerbaijan and facilitate trade.  This structure is also targeting Turkmen gas.  We are seeking Turkmen gas,” said Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yilmaz.

According to Gulmira Rzayeva of the Center for Strategic Studies of Azerbaijan, an expanded TANAP could increase Turkey’s chances of joining the European Union.  “Turkey can achieve political gains with this pipeline; it can be an ace in terms of its European Union membership negotiations.  With the finalization of this project, Turkey will have a whole new position within the region.”  Whether Turkey wants to join Europe is, of course, an open question.  Turkey’s annual growth continues at around 7%, while Europe continues to stagnate and — possibly–sink back into recession.

Posted by James J. Coyle

Tuesday, August 28, 2012

Potential Backers Lose Interest in TAPI

Despite support from both the United States and the Asian Development Bank, potential investors are backing away from the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline.  This proposal has been beset with concerns over security of the pipeline route, which passes through some of the most violent prone provinces in Afghanistan.

In the latest development, China has expressed new interest in Turkmen gas.  First, Chinese President Hu Jintao has proposed a new pipeline route that would bring Turkmen gas to China via Afghanistan.  The benefit of this latest proposal is that the pipeline route would traverse a safer route in Northern Afghanistan.  Second, China also signed in May 2012 an agreement with Turkmenistan to increase deliveries through the East-West Gas Pipeline from 30 bcm  per year to 65 bcm.  This pipeline does not pass through Afghanistan, has no security isues, and has been relatively trouble free since it opened in 2009.  Finally, China has assured Turkmenistan that its demand for natural gas will constantly increase over the next five years.  As a result, Turkmenistan’s enthusiasm has “softened” for TAPI, according to Pakistani correspondent Iqrar Haroon.

The Russian National Energy Institute has recommended the Russian government should avoid investing in TAPI because of security concerns, and questions over the viability of the project.  According to the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, the proposed increases in Chinese purchases of Turkmen gas will have a negative impact on Russia.  Turkmenistan offers lower-priced gas to China, bringing downward pressure on Russian gas prices.  Russia and China have been in talks since at least June 2009 to import 68 bcm of gas per year, but have not been able to agree on a price.

Posted by James J. Coyle

Monday, August 27

Trans Adriatic Pipeline Receives Funding Commitment

The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), the southern competitor for carrying Caspian gas from the Turkish border to Europe, has received an economic boost.  British Petroleum and Total have signed an agreement with the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (Socar) to fund the pipeline, designed to bring natural gas to Italy.   (The proposed Nabucco West would carry gas from the Turkish border to Baumgarten, Austria).  “These funds will contribute toward continued work in several important areas during the period running up to the final routing decision, expected in 2013,” said a TAP spokesman.

Kjetil Tungland, TAP’s managing director, issued a statement, “The signing of this agreement is a significant vote of confidence in the quality of TAP’s technical and commercial solutions from key industrial players, and underpins the cooperation agreement that was signed between TAP and Shah Deniz in June.”

While the Shah Deniz consortium has not yet decided between TAP and Nabucco West, TAP’s chances have been improved by both the funding, and by the pipeline obtaining government support.  Both the Greek and Italian governments have agreed to support the pipeline, something they previously had not done.  According to the Greek Foreign Ministry, Greek Deputy Energy Minister Makis Papagergiou and his Italian counterpart reached a “close cooperation agreement” to support the pipeline.  The Italian Foreign Ministry added, “Athens and Rome have decided to back the project after Aszerbaijan’s Shah Deniz 2 consortium chose TAP to transport gas to western Europe.  Nabucco West remains an alternative…”

With the Shah Deniz consortium sitting on the fence, other interested parties are also trying to cover all their bets.  the European Commission, which had previously said that Nabucco was a priority European project, has backed away.  It now says that it does not favor any project or route over another, as long as it carries Azeri gas, would diversify EU supplies, and would reduce EU dependence on Russian resources.  Similarly, BP is trying to support both TAP and its rival, Nabucco West.  “Our aim is to be involved in all aspects of the project so the aim is to be involved in Nabucco and TAP as well, and this is still being negotiated,” BP spokesman Toby Odone said.

Posted by James J. Coyle

Wednesday, August 22

Gazprom May Punish Hungary for Supporting Nabucco

Faced with Hungary’s approval of an environmental permit for the construction of the Nabucco pipeline, Gazprom may be considering moving west the route for the rival South Stream pipeline.

Reinhard Mitschek, managing director of Nabucco, announced on August 14 that Hungary was the first country to issue the project all its permits.  “The granting of this permit is a substantial step forward in Hungary and signifies the advanced stage of development of Nabucco West,” he said.

Within a week, Gazprom announced they were in talks with Croatia over the South Stream pipeline route.  “An intergovernmental agreement between Russia and Croatia on joint participation in the South Stream project was signed in 2010,” a spokesman commented.  “Currently, based on the results of a pre-investment stage, Gazprom and Plinacro Ltd. are discussing the terms of a shareholder agreement for a joint compnay project with a view to its subsequent establishment.”

The Croatian side is optimistic.  “At the moment the chances are 50:50 that we get the transit route of South Stream,” said a source involved in the Gazprom negotiations.  The reasons for changing the route are uncertain.    According to the Voice of Russia, a Croatian list serve, Jutarnji, listed a number of possible concerns:  lower costs, differences between Gazprom and the Hungarian leadership, uncertainty over ownership shares of various Hungarian companies, and slow work on the Hungarian economic feasibility stateement.  Gazprom’s board chairman Alexei Miller minimized these reasons, however, calling them “not significant.”  An unnamed Plinacro source added that there could be no official confirmation on the status of the talks, as both sides are bound by a mutual confidentiality pledge.

Timing would indicate the talks are retribution for Hungary’s cooperation with South Stream’s rival, Nabucco.  Whether the talks will result in the route change, or are merely a pressure tactic on Hungary by Gazprom officials, is yet to be seen.

SOURCE

Classified Nord-Ost Unknown Details [updated]

Written by newtimes.ru

Вторник, 23 Октябрь 2007

Exactly 5 (10 now,23/10/2012) years ago, on October 23rd, 2002, ‘Nord-Ost’ took place Terrorists seized the theatrical center on Dubrovka Street, located eight kilometers from the Kremlin, right in the middle of a show. On stage was the super-popular Moscow musical ‘Nord-Ost’, based on the novel ‘Two Captains’ by Benjamin Kaverin. Several dozen terrorists burst into the auditorium and took 912 spectators and performers hostage. The gunmen shot five. The tragedy lasted for 57 hours, while the terrorists demanded that President Putin withdrew his troops from Chechnya and stop the war. At dawn on October 26th, the federal headquarters gave the order to start a gas attack. Poison gas was used. The terrorists were eliminated: they were shot both during and after the gas attack. During the assault 67 hostages were killed, and 58 more died in buses and hospitals. One of the reasons for this was the gas was kept secret, and the doctors were not prepared to provide effective medical care. Tatiana Klokova, Elena Fedorova, and Olga Shorin prepared this material. October 23rd, 2002 10:45 pm REN-TV telephone interview with the producer of ‘Nord-Ost’, Alexei Ivashchenko: “They came onto the stage at the beginning of the second act. They started shooting, not blanks, but real bullets, because we saw how the bullets hit the wall. The actors rushed helter-skelter around the dressing room. Some managed to climb through a window. There was a lot of shooting.” 11:16 pm REN-TV breaking news: According to latest information, the terrorists warn security forces not to storm the building and are threatening to shoot for 10 people for every casualty on their side. This information was confirmed by radio station ‘Echo of Moscow’. On the Chechen separatist website kavkaz.org, they allege that the concert hall was seized by a Chechen suicide squad led by Movsar Barayev, the nephew of field commander Arbi Barayev, who was killed in Chechnya. October 24th, 2002 4:11 am REN-TV breaking news, reporter Anna Fedotova speaking by cell phone with hostage Maria Shkolnikova, who called during a live broadcast REN-TV: “What’s going on with you?” Hostage: “What’s happening is that people are waiting for the government to start negotiations to free them, but not through aggressive action, since this is impossible. The auditorium is completely booby-trapped. People will suffer if there is an assault. There must not be an assault! That’s how we on the inside feel, and you, of course, must decide this, I mean, those who will make this decision, but there are a lot of people here, about a thousand people. They are all very tired and very worried. There are children and a lot of women and a lot of old people, and we must now do something so that these people are released. We expect you to use a peaceful solution to the problem, not a military solution, because the people sitting here in this hall, they also condemn the war in Chechnya.” REN-TV: “Mariya, is there any change somehow in the mood of the criminals?” Hostage: “No. Right now we are listening to what radio ‘Mayak’ is saying, that the women, children, and foreigners will be released. That is not true! Only those who are going to storm the building are saying that. The women are here, the children are here, and the foreigners are here. Don’t make the situation out to be what it isn’t. There are a lot of people here, and a lot of children.” REN-TV: “Can the (hostages’) families speak by mobile phone? We got information that they were forbidden.” Hostage: “Relatives could speak by mobile phone, because there are a lot of mobile phones. Then the communications were jammed from the outside. I understand that it was jammed by the security services. They didn’t take away the phones, but now the batteries have started to go dead on us, and phones are going dead.” REN-TV: “Can you confirm that the terrorists have explosives?” Hostage: “Absolutely. There are women who left year-old children home and came here, and men. They are set up very powerfully. More than…” REN-TV: “Mariya, hang on!” Hostage: “We very much want to avoid an assault on the building. We want to see this problem resolved through negotiations, and we, as I said, we condemn what is happening in Chechnya.” REN-TV: “But what did the terrorists tell the people? Have they talked with you?” Hostage: “They said they have lost loved ones, and that they have nothing against us personally. This is simply their cry of despair, to draw attention and to try to solve the problem.” REN-TV: “I understand that this is a totally impossible situation, but would it possible now to speak with one of the hostage takers?” Hostage: “One second! (You can hear her asking: “Do you want to say something live on REN-TV?”) Now they’re giving me some figures. (She reads dictation.) During three years of the war in Chechnya there have been 3,000 children under the age of 10 killed. I’m repeating what they’re telling me. 4,500 children under 15 are disabled. 18,000 people are missing. Young people go missing! I’m repeating the words that they are saying. There is cleansing going on, they pick up young people and they disappear.” REN-TV: “Communications were lost. I would like to make the statement that, of course, we have no legal right to give terrorists a podium, but so far as this now affects the lives of so many people, women and children, we thought that in this case it could be possible.” 4:30 am Communications with hostage Mariya Shkolnikova are restored REN-TV: “Mariya, can you try to discuss the issue with some of the militants?” Hostage: “You try it! (You can hear her say: “This is the REN-TV television group.”) Militant: “Yes!” REN-TV: “Hello! We had a tentative agreement that you’d let into the building a film crew, and in return release some of the hostages. Is it possible to do this now? We couldn’t find any representatives from foreign embassies until now. Now we’re ready to find them, that is, they’re already here, we can call them and they’re willing to drive over.” Militant: “We’re not letting foreigners go in exchange for something. We’re just letting them go, understand? Because they are foreigners. Because this isn’t their business. Because this is our business: Russians and Chechens! Understand? Journalists, we’ll let in.” (The connection is lost.) 6:00 am Communications with hostage Mariya Shkolnikova are restored Hostage: “We need here the Red Cross, and ‘Doctors Without Borders’, and that the representatives of these organizations are only foreigners. They may negotiate with them.” REN-TV: “Seven ambassadors are now standing at the entrance to the building.” Hostage: “Listen to me carefully, take a piece of paper and write this down. From Belarus there are two people, Turkmenistan — three people, Germany — seven, Great Britain — three people, Switzerland — two people, the United States — four people, Ukraine — 18. Further on, Canada — one person, Bulgaria — one person, Australia — two people, Latvia — three people, Netherlands — two persons, Moldova 1 person, Yugoslavia — two people, add another person to Belarus, Azerbaijan — five people, Armenia — one person, Georgia — three people. Pass along that from the UK are some very important people, they have K-2 and K-1 visas, whatever that means.” REN-TV: “Mariya, how many kids in the auditorium?” Hostage: “A lot.” REN-TV: “How many is a lot?” Hostage: “Yes, add another three Ukrainians, please.” REN-TV: “Ukraine has 21 people.” Hostage: “Please, there should be representatives of these embassies, and representatives of ‘Doctors Without Borders’ and the Red Cross, but only if there were no people with Russian citizenship, because they will only negotiate with representatives from other…” REN-TV: “So, they want ‘Doctors Without Borders’ and the Red Cross. Mary, please pass along the following: there are now, we can even give their names, four ambassadors and two chief consuls from several countries, in particular, the British consul, the ambassador from the Netherlands, and the ambassador from Australia. It was hard to gather up these people, who are now standing at the entrance along with a film crew. So, now we’ll call and ask that representatives from the Red Cross and ‘Doctors Without Borders’ join us.” Hostage: “Representatives of Red Cross and ‘Doctors Without Borders’. Call them right now. Maybe you can try to bring out the people who are foreign nationals, and then you’ll just monitor as a film crew.” REN-TV: “We’ll do everything, we are now in touch with all the television stations. Mariya, I have a request: I beg you, don’t hang up if we will call you.” Hostage: “I’m not hanging up, but the fact is our battery is giving out.” REN-TV: “Tell me, are there any wounded?” Hostage: “No, no wounded.” REN-TV: “There wasn’t any shooting?” Hostage: “If there was shooting, it was only as a warning.” REN-TV: “But what about food, the condition of the people, water, what’s happening?” Hostage: “The people ate food and there was chocolate, and they drank water and juice.” REN-TV: “As a doctor, can you see what the situation is there, is anyone doing poorly…” Hostage: “Yes, (we need) mostly heart medicines, and analgesics.” 7:00 am Hostage Mariya Shkolnikova on REN-TV REN-TV: “Mariya, we’re bringing you phone batteries just in case, because it could turn out that our only communications may be through you.” Hostage: “Now there’s another issue: we really need for Aslanbek Aslakhanov (ed: at the time the Chechen Member of the Russian Parliament) to call me on the phone.” REN-TV: “Aslanbek Aslakhanov will contact you on this phone, we’ll do it now. Mariya, tell me, if the doctors can bring in some drugs, and what medicines are needed?” Hostage: “Yes, mostly sedatives, valerian, that’s all.” REN-TV: “They can bring them in, yes?” Hostage: “Yes, we only need that there’s nothing extra.” REN-TV: “Mariya, we understand everything.” Hostage: “Analgesics, valerian, heart medicines.” REN-TV: “Mariya, hang in there.” 7:30 am Hostage Mariya Shkolnikova on REN-TV REN-TV: “So, at this time the situation is this: representatives from the Red Cross are driving over… they’ve arrived.” Hostage: “Yes.” REN-TV: “Representatives of ‘Doctors without Borders’ cannot come, they are in the Caucasus, there are none in Moscow.” Hostage: “Okay.” REN-TV: “Ask them how this procedure should be performed. There’s a proposal. The ambassadors… Mariya, could these people take the phone? (Audible are several people speaking, the voice of the hostage and a militant. Mariya Shkolnikova gives the phone to the militant.) Militant: “Let her come alone without a camera. She comes close and they’ll open the door.” REN-TV: “Wait, who?” Hostage: “Politkovskaya.” REN-TV: “Politkovskaya, okay, this is new information. How about the ambassadors and representatives of the Red Cross, and the journalists, two film crews are standing there.” (The militant dictates to the hostage) Hostage: “When Politkovskaya comes up, she should yell that it is her, and hold her ID in her hand.” REN-TV: “What about the foreign ambassadors who came? They’ve already been waiting since six in the morning.” Hostage: “The ambassadors will have to wait.” REN-TV: “They keep changing their demands. We worked hard to gather several ambassadors and representatives of the Red Cross.” Hostage: “The response to that, is that the situation for everyone is dire.” REN-TV: “Okay, I’ll try to do it all. Thank you, once again hang in there.” 7:45 am REN-TV starts to search for Politkovskaya. She is in America. REN-TV: “Hello, Mariya…” Hostage (Anna Andrianova): “Mariya walked away.” REN-TV: “We have some information for you that is very important.” Hostage: “What?” REN-TV: “So, the militants put forward a demand that Politkovskaya should come to the building. Politkovskaya is currently in the U.S.” Hostage: “We have found this out.” REN-TV: “So, the ambassadors and the representatives of the Red Cross are standing here, everything that was demanded.” Hostage: “You know, there was some talk that they’re willing, as a matter of fact, to have at least some dialogue with Mr. Yavlinsky, if he can somehow…” REN-TV: “If it’s possible. These people every 15 or 20 minutes make new demands. I’m not a representative of the government or a representative of the headquarters, I represent a private television station.” Hostage: “But if you can, you have, as a private broadcaster, some outlets…” REN-TV: “We, of course, have outlets, but understand this: is it somehow still possible to directly engage them in dialogue, so that we don’t have to explain everything through you?” Hostage: “I’ll explain that, but they behave as though they’re not very interested, they’re operating from a position of strength, they condescendingly refer to our calls to you. They’ll make contact, but we must do something to make sure contact is not lost.” REN-TV: “Tell me, are they drugged, or something?” Hostage: “No. They’re acting from a position… They have one clear demand: the withdrawal of troops from their country. (Pause) …I have to ask you something, if you can come up with something with Yavlinsky.” REN-TV: “We’ll be sure to pass your request along to the headquarters.” Hostage: “And another request: not to use force. Here they say, let Yavlinsky and Hakamada come, they’re ready to talk with Hakamada.” REN-TV: “Understood, I’ll pass along your request.” Hostage: “And the old request, we’ve repeated it many times: everything is booby-trapped. That is to say no, absolutely no… So that they don’t scare them in anyway.” REN-TV: “I understand.” REN-TV and representatives of operational staff REN-TV: “Mitrokhin and Hakamada. I asked in what condition they were, if they were under the influence of drugs or not. She said no. They are working entirely from a position of strength… and since she said it in front of them, that means they were all standing close around her, not a very good feeling… They agreed… Medicines, understood… So, I’m calling Hakamada so that she can go there… Agreed, in touch… Okay. But could you send someone from the headquarters to our company, so that a man was sitting here, so that we could actively coordinate activities? (Hangs up.) …So, the headquarters says okay, Hakamada is ready to come, but not Yavlinsky, it’ll be his deputy, if they agree… So, you all just stand and wait, while we’ll send these members of parliament… And Sergey Yastrzhembsky said that they’ve prepared a suitcase full of medicines, so if you aren’t allowed in right away, give the whole suitcase full of medicine to Hakamada… That’s all, until the next call.” 10:00 am REN-TV and hostage Anna Andrianova REN-TV: “Across from the building are standing two Red Cross representatives, a foreign journalist, Mr. Franchetti, and Mr. Kobzon. They’re standing next to the building. They’re ready to start negotiations immediately.” Hostage: “I passed it on.” REN-TV: “Can these people enter the building, and how?” Hostage: “When I say that these people can go in, next to me is standing the man who says they’re allowed to enter. If this happens a half hour later, then this man will already be gone and it’ll be necessary to find him and repeat the order again. So do everything they say to do quickly, that’s the thing.” REN-TV: “Understood, we’ll do everything possible.” Hostage: “Yes, I understand that they need individuals who can influence government policy… to fight, and fight for the liberation of Chechnya, and whose opinion is important in the country.” REN-TV: “We’re doing everything possible, everything you say, but the demands keep changing, the names keep changing. Right now…” Hostage: “These aren’t demands, you understand, this is the position of these people. These people want the liberation of their country. Their demand is to stop the war, and all the rest are just the means. Those means suit the people here right now, because they need people with spotless, as it were, reputations in this matter.” REN-TV: “They can negotiate with these people, those whom they requested for negotiations, but how are these people, whom they demanded to for negotiations, how are they to enter the building?” Hostage: “The people who now came, I reported that they had come to them now, and I think they’ll go get them. Yes, they’re going to them.” REN-TV: “So what should they do, should they approach?” Hostage: “Stand outside the building.” REN-TV: “In what place by the building?” Hostage: “Let them go in and climb to the second floor.” REN-TV: “Go through the main entrance…” Hostage: “Through the main entrance, hands up, and climb to the second floor.” Militant: “They don’t have to have their hands up. Have them show their ID.” REN-TV: “Anya, ask them if it’s okay to bring the suitcase with the medicines that you requested.” Hostage: “The medications can come in, but they’ll be inspected.” 11:00 am From a statement by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov: “All night we tried to establish contact with the bandits. There was one telephone conversation between Member of Parliament Aslakhanov and one of the bandits. The conversation at first started quietly, but then got excited, then further telephone communication was interrupted… Our attempts to call phones that we know to be in the theater, and which belong to these bandits, were unsuccessful. They will not communicate.” 1:57 pm From a statement by the head of the FSB, Nikolai Patrushev: “During the course of the day there were a series of talks with chiefs of foreign intelligence services, who provided us with valuable information. The operational headquarters is acting with confidence, and decisively, firmly, and clearly predicting their actions.” 2:00 pm REN-TV and Mariya Shkolnikova REN-TV: “Mariya, what’s going on right now?” Hostage: “We’re assisting people who are getting worse and worse. There are a lot of them.” REN-TV: “The Chechen Diaspora is willing to negotiate. Which of them are their countrymen willing to let into the building?” Militant: “It’s not necessary to see the Chechen Diaspora here. They can speak with us at any time. If people want to show themselves here, let them come of their own initiative. I don’t think they’ll be harmed. You tell them that they must be credible people.” REN-TV: “Understood…” Hostage: “We’re waiting, because they promised that Nemtsov would be here, and it is our request, the people’s request, because so many people voted for Yavlinsky.” REN-TV: “I beg you, tell all those around you that everyone is doing everything possible to help you all.” Hostage: “Understand, there aren’t any results. So please, we’d really like to appeal to the people and to Putin, if there is a possibility for them just to take some serious measures.” REN-TV: “Now they want to see Nemtsov?” Hostage: “They don’t want to see Nemtsov, they agreed to conduct negotiations with Nemtsov, not negotiations, but to express to him their demands. Nemtsov, Yavlinsky and Hakamada are the people they hate the least.” REN-TV: “We spoke with Yavlinsky. He’s flying here, he’s making an effort to come here.” REN-TV: “Mary, tell me, were you given the medicines?” (The connection is lost.) 3:00 pm REN-TV and Mariya Shkolnikova REN-TV: “Hakamada is arriving.” Hostage: “Hakamada is arriving, that’s good. We want our government to make some kind of a decision, so that the crowd, if possible, would chant ‘pull out the troops’, otherwise they’ll shoot us now. They said this.” REN-TV: “A crowd will not chant this, there’s no crowd here, everyone’s very far away, and there’s a fence, they can see all this from the building. So, pass along the following, if possible: Hakamada is arriving and she is ready to enter into…” Hostage: “They won’t talk with just one woman.” REN-TV: “Understood, just pass along what I’m saying, you can just peacefully, in the same voice, calmly pass it along.” Hostage: “I just finished talking with them.” REN-TV: “No one is nearby?” Hostage: “No, they are far away.” REN-TV: “Very good. Anechka, I beg of you, I understand everything perfectly. So, Hakamada is ready to participate in negotiations. Yavlinsky is in Tomsk right now, his deputy is here, Mr. Mitrokhin, he is standing close by. Here Mitrokhin and Hakamada are ready to negotiate.” Hostage: “Mitrokhin isn’t suitable. They don’t know Mitrokhin. We need Nemtsov.” REN-TV: “Nemtsov?” Hostage: “Yes. If not Yavlinsky, them Nemtsov.” REN-TV: “But what about Hakamada?” Hostage: “Without them, she cannot enter.” REN-TV: “They’re in an aggressive mood, yes?” Hostage: “Now, yes. They want to shoot groups of ten people already. They said: start withdrawing troops, why isn’t your government doing anything to save you?” REN-TV: “Right now the headquarters is taking all actions, they are ready to make contact, not through you, because that’s not how negotiations are conducted. The authorities are now willing to negotiate.” 4:07 pm Josef Kobzon and Irina Hakamada leave the building. A representative of the terrorists, named Abu Bakar, spoke with the MPs. He was not wearing a mask. The terrorists’ promise to release 40 hostages was not fulfilled. 4:47 pm Mariya Shkolnikova is released from the theatrical center, carrying an appeal from the hostages to the President: “We ask you to make the sensible decision, to cease hostilities in Chechnya. You are at the top, and decide these issues, while we just watch. Enough of war, we want peace. Today we are in a life and death situation. We have parents, brothers, sisters, and children. Our lives are on your conscience. We ask you to resolve the issue peacefully, or too much blood will be spilled.” 5:20 pm REN-TV and Anna Andrianova REN-TV: “Anna, what’s going on there right now?” Hostage: “I won’t answer the question, what’s going on here… Can you tell me something about where Yavlinsky and Nemtsov are?” REN-TV: “Yavlinsky in Tomsk, he’s flying to Moscow, as far as I know.” Hostage: “When will he be here?” REN-TV: “At 9:30 pm, according to our information, the aircraft with Yavlinsky arrives in Moscow.” Hostage: “You know, it’s a long flight from Tomsk…” 9:17 pm From news reports: “Negotiations with the terrorists in Moscow are today being conducted by representatives of the Russian presidential administration. The terrorists have refused an offer to exchange hostages for members of parliament who volunteered. Earlier, the leader of the terrorists, who called himself Abu Said, communicated with the operational headquarters and said that inside the building are 50 terrorists: 25 men and 25 women.” 11:00 pm From REN-TV news: “In accordance with a decision by the operational headquarters for the hostage rescue operation, Grigory Yavlinsky has begun negotiations with the terrorists. The negotiators are asking the terrorists to initially release the children and foreign nationals. According to the headquarters, there are about 30 children. Inside the theatrical center building there is only drinking water and chocolate.” October 25th, 2002 3:00 am The director of the Center for Disaster Medicine, Leonid Roshal, and newly arrived from the U.S., Anna Politkovskaya, are allowed into the building. Roshal assisted several hostages and said that the situation is calm, no panic. Most of the hostages have health problems. There are serious illnesses, and four children remain held hostage by the terrorists. 9:00 am From REN-TV news: “Now on Melnikov Street a rally is being held. Relatives of the hostages have gathered by the theatrical center with banners reading ‘No to War in Chechnya’, ‘Down with the Russian army’. The desperate hostage relatives tried to break through a police cordon and enter the building. Among the hostages held by the terrorists are many children. There are continuous negotiations for their release, but no agreement could be reached.” 11:50 am Representatives of the Red Cross leave the building on Dubrovka with eight children. They were released without conditions. 3:04 pm From a statement by Vladimir Putin: “I believe that one of the goals of terrorists is to sow ethnic strife… In no case must we allow this to happen. We must not succumb to provocations from the criminals, and we have no right to allow any illegal acts.” 7:45 pm From REN-TV news: “Yevgeny Primakov entered the building. A half-hour later, Ruslan Aushev, then Alla Pugacheva entered. The negotiators refuse to speak with the press. 11:55 pm Shots are heart in the theatrical center building. October 26, 2002 4:45 am REN-TV breaking news: “In the area of the theatrical center building on Dubrovka, where it is already the third day that terrorists have been holding about 700 hostages, intense gunfire was heard. Three powerful explosions were heard. The police cordon was reinforced and special units have lined up in front of the building.” 5:30 am Gas is released into the building. 7:05 am The operation is complete. 11:00 am From REN-TV news: “A few minutes ago in the Kremlin, a meeting between the President of Russia, FSB director Nikolai Patrushev, and Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov, ended. At the meeting it was said that a coordinated operation was conducted and the work of all agencies involved in the release of the hostages had been assessed as competent and coherent. The FSB director reported to the President that the operation would not end there. The Federal Security Service has a number of materials that they are ready to act upon.” *** During the assault on ‘Nord-Ost’ there were 57 awards handed out: 5 Hero of Russia stars. Soldiers from ‘Alfa’ and ‘Vympel’, who participated in the operation to destroy the militants, only received two of the stars. Two other stars were given to the operational headquarters: FSB General Vladimir Pronichev, the commander of the hostage rescue operational headquarters, and FSB General Alexander Tikhonov, commander of the FSB special forces center. The fifth Gold Star was awarded to the chemist who released the gas into the theatrical center. This became an open letter from the commandos of ‘Alfa’, who told about the classified presidential award decree. 2 Orders of Courage were awarded, to Leonid Roshal and Josef Kobzon. 50 ‘Nord-Ost’ memorial medallions were awarded to members of the Moscow city government and the Moscow city parliament, including those who were on vacation or on business trips outside Moscow during the hostage crisis. The medallions included the phrase ‘for empathy’. Maria Shkolnikova is the head of the Russian Association of Pediatric Cardiology, a doctor of medical science, a professor and chief pediatric cardiologist for the city of Moscow, and deputy director of the Moscow Institute of Pediatrics and Pediatric Surgery Medical University. Maria Shkolnikova was released on the second day after her capture, on October 24th, in order to pass along an appeal from the hostages. She is now continuing to work as the chief cardiologist for the city of Moscow. Anna Andrianova is the chief of the advertising service for the newspaper ‘Moskovskaya Pravda’. She was among the hostages for all of the 57 hours, right up to the assault. At 5:30 am, she phoned to report that the gas had been put into operation. Under the influence of gas, she lost consciousness. She came to the evening of October 26th in the 13th Municipal Hospital. She survived. She continues to head the advertising service for ‘Moskovskaya Pravda’. The terrorists took 912 people hostage. 42 were released before the assault. Of these, Yosef Kobzon brought out four women and three children, while doctors from the Red Cross brought out an Englishman and 8 children. The remaining hostages that the militants released for various reasons were mostly children and foreign nationals. Of the latter, four citizens of Azerbaijan left the building on the night before the assault. On July 11th, 2007, the ‘Nord-Ost’ organization sent the Prosecutor General’s Office a request for criminal proceedings to be initiated against members of the operational headquarters in charge of the hostage rescue. In their statement, ‘Nord-Ost’ noted that the organization of medical assistance to the victims during the hostage rescue was not up to standard. In particular, the gas used to neutralize the terrorists, and which in turn affected the hostages, had no antidote, according data of ‘Nord-Ost’. This is not the first lawsuit against the leaders of the operation. In November of 2002, the first group of plaintiffs filed their suit in the Tver district court, against the Moscow city government. They stated that the rescue operation was poorly planned and organized. The court rejected the claims. On April 28th, 2003, Moscow city court considered an appeal. The court stated that the investigation into the events of October 23–26, 2002, were still ongoing, and that a causal relationship between the special operation and the loss of life had not been established, nor was any guilt found on the part of those responsible for the operation. As a result, the applicants’ claims were rejected. The Russian Supreme Court found no actions by the district and city courts to be in violation of the law. Foreign nationals sued the federal government in the Basmanny Court. The court also rejected their claims. In early April of 2007, proceedings in the ‘Nord-Ost’ case began in the Strasbourg court. The Russian government has already submitted its objections and comments on the suit. The plaintiffs received nearly fifteen hundred pages recently, for their information. They have until November 12th to send to the European Court of Human Rights their response to the Russian government’s arguments. Russian law enforcement authorities have denied the victims access to materials from the criminal cases, examinations, and witness interviews. newtimes.ru

As Novaya Gazeta reported in its previous issue, the Strasburg court has advised the lawyers Igor Trunov and Karinna Moskalenko about the fact the consideration of the Nord-Ost complaint will be classified.

No doubt, such a decision must be met with joy by Russian authorities who have done all their best to classify the circumstances of the terrorist act and the reasons that caused the death of the hostages. Anna Politkovskaya, who in person carried out talks with terrorists, tried to destroy this curtain of secrecy and carried out her own journalist investigation.

February 2003

The judge Gorbacheva from the Tverskoi inter-municipal court considered the tragic story of death of Timur Khaziev, 27, the member of the orchestra in Nord-Ost. The general number of lawsuits was 61. As of today, three first applications have been dismissed.

“When Timur came to work on his last day, he had 10 different IDs with him: the one proving that he is an artist at the Nord-Ost orchestra, the passport, driver’s license… But in the end, when the family received his corpse with a rubber label on his hand, there was a sign there “#2551 Khamiev, unknown”…The family are sure that the death was caused with the fact that no medical aid was given to him, as most likely, his body was taken for that of some terrorist… Khaziev’s family only has certificates of death where no cause of the death is pointed. There is just a blank space. And there is no mention that there was any terrorist act at all”.

April 2003

“The taking of over 800 hostages in the Theater Center on Dubrovka Street in Moscow might have been controlled by Russian special services…Such a conclusion is possible to be made after an interview with Khanpash Terkibaev, 30.

<…> Apparently, this Khanpash has been the man looked for by all those involved in the Nord-Ost tragedy. The man, who secured the terrorist act from inside. According to the information by Novaya Gazeta (and this vainglorious man does not even try to deny it!), Khanpash is the planted by special services agent. He entered the building together with terrorists, as a member of their group. According to him, he had been securing the passage in Moscow and to the Nord-Ost building. <…> Not waiting till the attack made by special unit, he just left the building. He had the map of the place, while either Baraev the nephew, who commanded the terrorist group, or the special unit preparing for the attack, did not have such a map. If there has been such an agent in Nord-Ost that means the authority had been aware of the planned terrorist act. <…> That changes the general course of events of a half a year ago.

August 2003

Anna Politkovskaya has been visited by some representative of a “special group under Moscow Prosecutor’s office, investigating the Nord-Ost case”.

“Naturally, this man turned out to be an FSB investigator. Of course, I know his name, but it does not matter. His appearance itself and his behavior was an indication of HOW all that was done – the check and examination. He said he only had 15-20 minutes and so I had to be laconic. He said the case was about to be dismissed, and now it was no good idea to deal with this “information”, and actually they had found nothing like that during their investigation. He asked a few formal questions and he was not interested to know any special details. He did not even include that into protocol, saying it did not matter much. The only thing he was interested in was that after our publication Basaev threatened to deal shortly with Terkibaev as with traitor. And that interest was put into protocol exactly in accordance with the Criminal Code. So what did this FSB worker come for? Just to find the way of protecting one’s agent and take him out of danger posed by Basaev.  <…> And soon it was announced about closing the Nord-Ost case, considering there were no members of the terrorist group to remain alive and dismissing the investigative group.”

January 2004

A month before the investigation was finished a meeting was held in Moscow Prosecutor’s Office where the investigator from the Investigative Department for Gangsterism and Murders Vladimir Kalchuk met the former hostages and families of those killed in the terrorist act.

“Mr. Kalchuk was asked main questions worrying the involved people, but he did not answer any. However, he told about many other tings…

Q: Do you consider that the video published by Novaya Gazeta might have shown the destruction of some hostages (this is about issue #90 of Novaya Gazeta for 2002. The pictures shot on 26 October 2002 at 6:51 on the threshold of the Theater Complex on Dubrovka Street where a camouflaged woman is aiming and probably shoots at a man with his hands cuffed on his back).

A: No one terminates anyone at that video. This is how journalists want it to look like. We have made an expertise. There a dead body was shifted from one place to another and the woman just shows where it is. We know whose corpse it is.

Q: Whose?

A: I won’t tell you. I tell you something and you will write it is all a lie.  <…>

Q: A question about Terkibaev (one of the terrorist group members, who had left the building before the assault started. – note by editorial board).

A: Terkibaev was not there. And Politkovskaya did not help us. She refused giving any information on Terkibaev. She said “I don’t know anything”.

At the end of the two-hour meeting I had to remind to Mr. Kalchuk the truth about Terkibaev’s case. The matter is that after repeated requests by us, an investigator Timoshin (Kalchuk’s subordinate) came finally to our office and collected all the information we had. That was done and registered with protocol.

Reaction by Mr. Kalchuk to that remainder was inadequate. He told I should stop writing about the topic, otherwise he would hint to the victims of Nord-Ost that my phone number was found in the data base of the terrorists’ phone, and “then we shall see what they will do to you… And actually one may get interested what related you personally to terrorists”. <…> “It was necessary to carry out talks with the terrorists, and so I did”.

February 2004

“During a year and four months only fathers and mothers, not the community, convinced the investigator Kalchuk to allow them to see the materials of cases about the causes of the deaths of their relatives. Finally, he allowed that to some of them under condition they would not copy it officially. <…> so that no further court proceedings followed.  <…>

The parents write out the forensic conclusions about deaths of their children. Here is a one of them, the initial one: “The diagnosis: poisoning with a toxic substance”. It’s clear that it was a poison and not a harmless gas. The initial forensic diagnosis establishes that almost all the killed died from a “toxic” or “unknown” toxic substance. <…> The investigative group, having received over a hundred similar forensic expertises, did not do what it had to. It did not try to establish what exactly gas was it.  <…> Instead, the investigators set about the opposite. They decided that repeated indirect expertises should be done to everyone who died.  <…> The “commissions” established; all those who died (with the exception of 6 persons who died due to non-administering the medical aid) had come to the performance suffering the inner diseases (!), actually they were just seriously ill people, and their diseases had not stood the stress caused by a group of Chechen terrorists. <…> Once special services blabbed out accidentally: “With a purpose of prevention of mass death of innocent people…a special recipe was applied on the basis of derivatives of Fentanil. <…> In accordance with the effective law the data about the composition used in the course of the special counter-terrorist operation cannot be published… (Signed by the head of FSB for Moscow and Moscow region V.N.Zakharov, # 1/1471 dated 03.11.2003)” Mr. Kalchuk looked at that paper, brought to him by the victims, and said (I heard that myself) “I didn’t see that. I don’t know it. Fentanil? Never heard of it”.

April 2004

«<…> 129 killed. All the terrorists destroyed. One accomplice to terrorists (recognized by the court), Zaurbek Talkhigov, got sentenced to 8 years. Another accomplice, Khanpash Terkibaev was killed in a car accident under odd circumstances. Official investigation by Vladimir Kalchuk is going on sluggishly, while all the attempts for a parallel investigation are just ridiculed. What gas was used? Who is responsible for its composition? Who gave the order? Who did not give the order to administer specialized help to those suffered form this gas?  <…> One year and a half after, all those questions are only asked by victims and not by officials.”

July 2004

“All the victims, as it is reported officially, died from their own numerous diseases at the background of dehydration and stress and only slightly due to the use of “non-identified chemical substance”. But why during two years no one has been able to recognize THIS substance? No answer ever was given to that”.

November 2004

A sensation happens in Nord-Ost case: it’s been for the first time after two years that the victims were able to read the decision by the prosecutor’s office about refusing to start a separate criminal case. At the third attempt the judge Susina managed to make the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office submit to the court the materials of criminal case #229133.

…”According to explanation by A.Y.Alabov (his position is not pointed; it appears that this is a special service officer – A.P.)  <…> he saw with his own eyes the doctors light into eyes of the victims, and then the victims were made injections in the gluteal region. <…> What doctors? Officially, there were no doctors in the lobby at 6:30 a.m. Then who could have lit with the flashlights? Was it about mysterious chemists who kept on their experiments and made hastily injections to their still-alive victims, using antidotes known to them only?”

“From the account by the chief physician of Hospital #13: no official information explaining the reasons of the state of the arrived patients was given”. Even these words by the doctor were ignored by investigators: why those who must have informed and who knew what the people had been poisoned with, why didn’t they tell that to the doctors? Investigation did not even try to ask such a question”.

Outcome: “To refuse starting a criminal case in relation to absence of crime in the act <…> by officials responsible for organization of administering medical aid”. This decision was dated 31 December 2002. Over two years have been spent on concealment the main state secrecy.”

April 2005

The victims have managed to get the head of the investigative group Vladimir Kalchuk summoned to the court proceeding. Anna Politkovskaya quotes the dialogs by the lawyer Karinna Moskalenko and Mr. Kalchuk.

M: Where and when did Alexander Letyago die? In hospital? Or in the auditorium?

K: (getting annoyed and beginning to speak in informal tone) Why are we beating the air again? I’ve got many similar cases. Letyago’s death? I just don’t remember.

M: Has the investigative group established the substance used by the special unit during assault made?

K: I was based on official expertise. There was no mentioning any gas there. That all was made up by the media.

M: Then why the page 13 of your report says that the use of Nalaxon (a strong medication used for blocking the drugs with the treatment of addiction of the opium type – A.P.) did not play significant role in the state of the victims?

K: Why do you keep asking? That’s because the victims had been taking this substance constantly. (It’s necessary to explain this statement by the investigator: he affirms that as the unrecognized chemical substance was found with practically all the 129 killed victims, that means all of them had been taking drugs – A.P.).

M: Did the investigation make enquiries so that to identify the substance?

K: Are you teaching me how to work? What else do you want to know? I’m not going to say you anything more!

M: But you are standing before the court.

K: (speaking without the judge’s permission): I’m not going to say anything, you won’t learn anything from me. And I’ll never come here again. I don’t want it.”

December 2005

“This turned out after it had been managed to copy the materials for 60 killed persons, including the forensic expertises. It is pointed there that 40 out 60 persons had not been administered medical aid. The victims wrote a letter to Putin saying that “the materials of investigation have allowed to correct the number of killed – that’s no less than 174 people. The figure of 129 is the frozen figure of three years ago! It is not clear who did this mistake and hid the 45 killed people during three years! The forensic expertises enabled the opportunity of estimating the properties by “harmless” gas. All the vitally important organs were affected with the dead victims after the assault made, which was mortal for them: “sudden heart death”, “syndrome of fast death” – these are just variations of the causes of collective fatal outcome, that may be read in the forensic protocols.”

“Nord-Ost victims have taken every possible step. They placed actions and got refusals in Tverskoi, Zamoskvorezky, Nikulinsky Courts of Moscow, in the Court of Moscow City, in the Constitutional Court. There is only hope for Strasburg, where the case is waiting for its turn being titled as ‘Chernetsova and others versus the Russian Federation’ “.

 

By Marina Daineko

July 13th, 2007

In MZ

http://www.newswe.com/Exclusive/ex1.php#pa118

 

 

 

The face of a little girl who will never grow up.

 

 

But who will answer for this and many other broken lives?

Bright is her memory. Hers, and the memory of all who died at Dubrovka.

The face of a little girl, for whose death old men received medals.

“Happiness is a philosophical concept, and every family has its own happiness. Happiness in our family was Sashenka.” So wrote her aunt, Roza Ishchenko. Look at the Memorial Book, reader. Look at the bright face of this little girl who will forever remain 13. The face of a little girl, who, perhaps, while still alive, was tossed onto the steel floor of a medical service UAZ van by her so-called rescuers, and then covered by the bodies of 12 other hostages.

She was born in Karaganda, Kazakhstan, in 1989. The web site created and maintained by her mother, Svetlana Gubareva, has a memorial book with a page dedicated to every hostage of the Dubrovka theatrical center. Sasha’s address is: http://nord-ost.org/kniga-pamyati/letyago-aleksandra.html.

“Knowing our laws and the work of our Prosecutor General, the connections between that office and the government, we cannot count on anything. ‘Nord-Ost’ is a forbidden theme and it is not advantageous for our prosecutors or the government to investigate this. We have received so much information that the prosecutor would have to work too hard to disprove the evidence against those in charge of the operation at Dubrovka. We, however, do not even rule out the personal responsibility of even the president,” declared Tatiana Karpova, coordinator for the ‘Nord-Ost’ public organization.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

“At the very bottom was a 13-year-old girl…”

 

By Svetlana GUBAREVA for NEWSWE.COM

 

The hostage rescue operation could be divided into two parts. The first part covered the actions of the special forces. This part was considered to be a success, and the general consensus is that the actions of the special forces prevented the explosion of the building, and the use of the ‘special substance’ led to a quick knockout of the terrorists. The facts we have gathered from the criminal case and the media, however, attest to the preconceived nature of this assertion.

 

 

 

In her book, ‘Through the eyes of a former hostage’, T. Popova recounts the words of one of the hostages, who told about what went on at that moment in the auditorium: “We all saw white smoke coming from above, and noticed a smell. A woman terrorist was sitting next to me. She said, ‘this is a gas attack — go wet something and breath through this cloth, head for the exit and the ambulances will come for you soon’. My friend and I went to the exit and we told other hostages along the way, but no one came with us. They were afraid to walk past the bomb. We decided that if they were going to blow us up, then it didn’t matter where we were, and we got to the exit. I passed out right at the door.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

There are more than enough facts that attest to the negligence in organizing medical assistance. Many have viewed scenes from the video chronicle in which one can see the process of carrying people from the theater, piling them on the steps, and loading them into buses without providing enough medical workers or drugs.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Referring to this article, I sent a petition to the prosecutor’s office demanding that they investigate and determine the details of what occurred, but I was refused the satisfaction of my legal desire. The investigator did not acquaint me with any kinds of materials that would answer my questions, but did not forget to ask for my signature on a non-disclosure agreement. I consider this an attempt to force me to silence.

Right away it was clear that several persons had were already dead in the vehicle. Not from the gas, but from being crushed under other bodies. At the very bottom was a 13-year-old girl. Diagnosis: crushed to death.”

The first assignment for the intensive-care workers was to unload the vehicle. Fortunately, it was a good time. 9 a.m. was shift change, and there were twice as many workers as usual. They were brought to bear, including this reporter who at first tried to work in his specialty, but after a look from the chief of the department, began to help.

The doors were finally opened, while they, in turn, opened the doors of their vehicle. The department workers’ hair stood on end. Inside the 12-seat UAZ were 30 (THIRTY!) casualties, stacked on top of each other like cordwood (you cannot describe it any other way). Motionless. Without any gunshot wounds. Those who were in the front of the microbus could say nothing about the nature of the injuries.

“…No one even paid attention to the khaki-colored UAZ van that drove up to the department’s doors at about 9 a.m. Those who brought the UAZ did not know that around the side was a door that was always open, for service personnel, and so for a long time they beat against the locked reception doors.

Not long ago I learned how they rescued Sasha. While putting together materials for the web site, I found an old article with a detailed description of the events: http://nord-ost.org/vospominaniya/rasskazyivaet-zhurnalist-ochevidets-sobyitiy.html

I believe that whoever made the decision to use the gas (whether it was the chief of the headquarters staff or V. V. Putin personally) could not help but know that, in making such a decision, he was sentencing us to death. While those who carried out the orders conducted a combat operation at first, they later, in full kit, carried hostages out of the theater because at that moment there was no one else to do it. One of them carried my daughter.

 

Sasha Letyago in the arms of a special forces soldier, a frame from the video chronicle

The use of the ‘special substance’ under conditions where they could not control the individual dosage for each hostage, or provide immediate medical assistance to the casualties, significantly increased the chances of a lethal finale for the hostages.

One can divide ‘siloviki’ into two types: those who made the decision and gave the orders, and those who carried out these orders. The former head of the KGB’s 3rd Directorate (military counter-intelligence), Vice Admiral Alexander Zhardetsky, in an interview with Interfax on October 24th, 2002, stated that it would be impossible to use a gas attack, since children, and adults with illnesses, would “undoubtedly come to a fatal end”.

The facts presented prove that the use of the ‘special substance’ in the theater did not correspond with the reasons for its use: the gunmen were not rendered motionless, and they were able to actively resist.

“Literally right after entering the building, the special forces as one Alfa group member puts it, ‘met counter-fire from assault rifles’. One of the terrorists was shot down in the corridor, and when they entered the room where Barayev and his comrades had given their interview two days before, they again met with fire. Return fire with assault rifles and grenades destroyed the gunmen. According to a ‘Vympel’ team member, the special units entered the auditorium from the direction of the stage and the main entrance. He stated that the bandits on stage fired on the special forces, but were destroyed by return fire. A female terrorist was killed by the hall entrance while she was trying to throw a grenade and fire on the special forces men. The ‘V’ team man stated, ‘in one hand she had a pistol and in her other hand was a grenade with the pin pulled, but she never managed to release the handle’.”

Following the operation, representatives of the special forces gave an interview on television station ‘Rossiya’. Not long ago I managed to view this interview and read an article on it. The special forces soldiers told how a large number of terrorists were conscious and brought frantic, armed resistance to bear: http://nord-ost.org/2002/terroristyi-okazali-ozhestochennoe-vooruzhennoe-soprotivlenie-2.html

From an analytical report on the results of the hostage interrogations (case volume 1, pages 95-6): http://nord-ost.org/prilozheniya-k-dokladu/prilozhenie-14.-analiticheskaya-spravka-po-rezultatam-issledovaniya-protokolov-dop.html “…At the moment of the assault, when the gas was released, Barayev began running around the auditorium and shouting for the windows to be opened. Several terrorists opened fire from the stage, but the hostages were unable to say in which direction they were shooting. The female terrorists did not try to blow themselves up. They covered their faces with their shawls and lay down on the floor among the hostages. In ten minutes everyone was unconscious.”

“ANDRIANOVA: I don’t know what kind of gas it is, but I see the reaction, that these people don’t want the deaths of ours and theirs, but I think our ‘siloviki’ (military, police, and security services) have started doing something, I think they don’t want us to make it out of here alive and they’re ending the situation this way…”

From the transcript:

Radio station ‘Echo of Moscow’ has an audio recording of a telephone call made at 5:30 a.m. on October 26th, 2002; at the very moment the gas was released into the auditorium. You can listen to it (or read the transcript) on the web site: http://nord-ost.org/hronika-terakta/telefonnyiy-razgovor-s-zalozhnitsami-pered-samyim-nachalom-shturma-tts-na-dub.html. The conversation lasts about four minutes – time enough to connect the contacts of a bomb. None of the terrorists, however, made such an attempt.

For the sake of the future of a country whose leadership learned nothing from this tragedy.

For the sake of the memory of the 129 who died together with her.

For the sake of the memory of Sasha Letyago, who in three days would have been 18.

And so we do not keep quiet.

“I know that as long as ‘kangaroo courts’ reign in Russia our chances are minimal, or more precisely, exactly zero. I have already passed through the circles of Hell in court hearings, and I can well imagine what the result will be this time. The Prosecutor General will send the declaration to various agencies, and later there will be a refusal to satisfy the declared demands. I think that the prosecutor’s office will not labor too hard over the justification and the refusal will have some sort of general wording. Later, those who wrote the petition will appeal it in court. It will not be too hard to guess the court’s decision: another refusal. You say that I am a pessimist? No, I am a well-informed optimist; otherwise I would never have even tried ‘beat on a locked door’. After all, one cannot change the world if one does nothing. For most people it was an abstract number, a mere 130 people dying, but they were for us our loved ones, our ‘one and only’. If you have time to read some of the documents, then you will understand why it is impossible to keep quiet about the deaths of these ‘mere 130’.”

I asked her a question by e-mail: what does she think about the group of ‘Nord-Ost’ people who sent a declaration to the Prosecutor General demanding criminal charges against members of the hostage rescue headquarters (a petition that journalists at Grani.ru with their light touch have named ‘Dubrovka against the Lyubyanka’). Svetlana replied almost immediately:

“…Everything’s fine here,” Sveta writes. “I spend a lot of time on correspondence, since one has to talk people into things and direct the process of collecting information by long distance. To convince someone of something in a letter is a lot harder than in conversation. You must think out your arguments with care, and since I think slowly, writing letters is a long and tortuous process. Between letters I go outside the city. The strawberries are ripe and there are already raspberries, mulberries, and cherries along the way. There are a lot of strawberries this year…”

Svetlana Gubareva now lives in Karaganda, or, as she puts it, “a life apart from the Muscovites”. She actively works on bringing to life her idea of a memorial book, http://nord-ost.org/kniga-pamyati/3.html, in which there would be a page dedicated to every one of the 130 who died at Dubrovka.

Judging from the London precedent, however, there may be no objective answers from the Russian Prosecutor General.

Time will tell what sort of answers the Strasbourg court receives.

All these questions essentially coincide with the demands of the former hostages and the relatives of the dead, who for five years have been fighting for a normal investigation into the ‘Nord-Ost’ criminal case.

Were the courts independent and objective, considering the financial support the Moscow city government provides the courts?

Did the government pay attention to all circumstances in identifying and punishing those guilty of the violent operation?

With regards to the lack of medical assistance, were the hostages subject to humiliation and inhumane treatment during the hostage rescue operation?

Was the decision to end the crisis by force (using gas) absolutely necessary?

Did the authorities do everything possible to solve the hostage problem at Dubrovka through negotiations?

Secondly, in the beginning of April of this year, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg has begun hearings on a complaint by 57 victims of the ‘Nord-Ost’ case, under the collective title ‘Chernetsova and others versus Russia’. The Russian government was sent a host of very embarrassing questions, such as, for example:

First off, the ‘Nord-Ost’ case, which has now been halted, has joined with other cases – the victims of the terror acts in Beslan and Volgodonsk.

The most important thing, in my overseas view, is this:

Now it is July of 2007. What has happened in all these years?

A bit later Svetlana says that all the decisions on the causes of death are identicle, like twin brothers, and are lies from beginning to end because, according to these specially instructed experts, the reason from the fatal outcome in each case was allegedly “a confluence of factors: a lack of water, stress, serous chronic diseases, and being seated in an uncomfortable position for a long time. The special substance, however, has merely a coincidental relationship with death”. (The name ‘special substance’, apparently, is understood to be the gas that poisoned people at Dubrovka.)

February of 2004. The fat packet of papers that arrived from Moscow has been sitting there a long time, unopened. Svetlana could not get here to Brooklyn from snowed-in New Jersey. Finally she arrives, the package is opened and, sitting on the old sofa in our living room, Svetlana reads the forensic medical decision regarding the death of her 13-year-old daughter, Alexandra Letyago-Gubareva. As she reads, I carefully pick up the awful pages as she finishes them and try to make out the printed lines through my tears.

When speaking at the third anniversary of the tragedy, Svetlana Gubareva addressed the dead: “Forgive us that we still haven’t found and punished the guilty. Justice is still mute, but sooner or later everyone must answer for all they have done in this life, answer before the highest court, which they even call celestial. This court grants no immunity, it is unprejudiced, cannot be bribed, and is inescapable. One day they will have to answer for your deaths, for ‘Nord-Ost’. Excuse us for not protecting you back then. We have no way to fix the past.”

From that phone call on, everything changed for me.

The ‘Nord-Ost’ tragedy entered my life almost 5 years ago, in October of 2002, when a reader called the offices of the newspaper I was working at and said that she knew Sandy Booker, the only American citizen who died during the hostage seizure in the theatrical center at Dubrovka.

 

It was this organization that filed a petition with the Russian Prosecutor General, demanding that a criminal case be brought against members of the hostage rescue headquarters. Directors of the organization declared this at a press conference on Wednesday, July 11th. They accuse FSB director Nikolai Patrushev and his assistant, Vladimir Pronichev, as well as the chief of the FSB special forces center, Alexander Tikhonov, and the former secretary of the president’s security council, Vladimir Rushailo. At the same time they made the petition to the Prosecutor General, the human rights advocates sent a similar letter to Vladimir Putin.

Deadly gas use haunts Moscow theater hostages 10 years later

Topics: Moscow ♦ russia

A decade after Chechen militants seized a Moscow theatre in a hostage crisis which left 130 people dead, victims’ families are still seeking answers about use of a deadly gas by Russian forces to end the siege.

A total of 912 people, many of them children, were held hostage in the Dubrovka theatre for three days after coming to watch Nord Ost, a popular musical, on October 23, 2002.

The crisis ended on October 26 when Russian special forces filled the building with an unknown gas to neutralise the attackers, who had threatened to blow up the venue unless Russia pulled its troops out of Chechnya.

The effects of the gas killed 125 people, as well as the 40 attackers who were shot after being knocked out by the gas. The hostage-takers themselves killed five people.

The bloody end to the siege, two years into Vladimir Putin’s presidency, damaged his image as it appeared his regime had not made it a priority to prevent the deaths of the trapped civilians.

Survivors and victims’ relatives remain highly critical of how the authorities handled the crisis.

“We sat without moving in our seats right next to the stinking orchestra pit which had been transformed into a toilet,” a former hostage who wanted to be identified only as Oleg told AFP.

“We were exhausted after three days without food or water,” and were waiting for an assault as “our only chance to be liberated from that nightmare”.

But what followed was “chaos,” he said.

“Ten years have gone by, but so many questions are still unanswered,” said Natalia Kurbatova, whose 13-year-old daughter Kristina, one of the young stars of the musical, was among those killed.

“Why didn’t the authorities negotiate with the militants’ leader, at least to let the children go? What was the gas that killed our loved ones?” Kurbatova demanded.

“I still don’t know how she died,” she said in an interview with AFP. Her daughter was only found in the morgue the day after the security forces stormed the building.

Medical aid to the exhausted hostages who inhaled the gas was poorly organised, said survivors, with most of the deaths resulting from suffocation rather than from explosions or gunshots.

Russian courts however have systematically rejected lawsuits from the former hostages, who have blame the authorities and demanded compensation.

Last December, the European Court of Human Rights ordered Russia to pay 1.25 million euros ($1.6 million) to 64 claimants, including ex-hostages and relatives of those killed during the siege.

“The gas didn’t kill people right away, and many people died because they weren’t properly tended to,” said lawyer Igor Trunov, who represented the Nord-Ost victims in court.

“The doctors didn’t know the composition of the gas. To this day it is classified. There wasn’t enough of the antidote. The ambulances didn’t have access to the building, and the hospitals weren’t ready to accommodate so many ex-hostages.”

While the Strasbourg court did not criticise Russia’s use of force and the noxious gas, it did highlight the lack of preparation for the rescue operation.

The European court ordered Russia to reopen its investigation into the victims’ deaths and possible negligence by officials, but Moscow’s powerful Investigative Committee has refused to do so.

Moscow has experienced more horrifying attacks since Dubrovka. A 2011 suicide bombing in its main Domodedovo airport killed 36 people and a double suicide bombing in the metro in 2010 killed 40.

A recent poll by the independent Levada Centre pollster found that 53 percent of Russians expect more acts of terror and hostage-takings.

“The main way to protect ourselves from attacks is the work of the special forces, using agents to infiltrate terrorist networks to prevent attacks,” said military analyst Alexander Golts.

“But I wouldn’t say Russia’s special forces have advanced far on that front,” he added.

[Image via Agence France-Presse]

 

Golden Dawn Immigrants-Fake NeoNazi’s

All those links were sent to me on Twitter and I am more than glad to post them,I do beleive I will find more on those people due time.No threats allowed according to the WP policy or the HR declaration. So please stay vigilant of what you are going to post :)I checked all blog categories so that the post can get the most views possible. Regards!

“##Spiros Macrozonaris## IMMIGRANT Golden Dawn Deputy leader in Montreal, Canada” :

Facebook profile :

INTERESTING FACEBOOK POST MR. MACROZONARIS, HE CANNOT EVEN WRITE GREEK! BAD NAZI BAD! :

His NON 100% PURE GREEK son’s Facebook : https://www.facebook.com/macrozonaris?ref=ts&fref=ts

1. Greek Immigrant who married a “foreigner” >>>>>French-Canadian Doris Morrissette, they bore a son, Nicolas Macrozonaris (World-Class Sprinter – CANADIAN Olympian 🙂 ..who unfortunately is not 100% Pure Greek…

2. Conversations with Nicolas on Twitter, lead to nothing, he is ‘pretending’ that he has NO knowledge of what Golden Dawn supports and believes YET he states that he does not condone his fathers “actions”

Twitter @Macrozonaris TWEETER CONVERSATIONS with Nicolas –>

###### MUST WATCH #####
Video from CBC Montreal, from week of Oct 12th – INTERVIEW with Spiros Macrozonaris – next to him sits LOOSER Ilias Hondronicolas : http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v-3rbLI4K78

#Ilias Hondronicolas ———> on PHOTO second guy from the left :

#MORE HONDRONICOLAS:

(FRIENDS WITH ELENI ZAROULIA SHARING HER PHOTOS!)
( MUST SEE )

#MORE PAPAGEORGIOU:

US upset about Iran-Iraq-Syria alliance-US meddling fuels violence in Syria

Hezbollah Secretary-General Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah confirms the Lebanese resistance movement has sent a drone deep into the Israeli airspace evading radar systems.

The operation code-named Hussein Ayub saw Hezbollah’s drone fly hundreds of kilometers into the Israeli airspace and getting very close to Dimona nuclear plant without being detected by advanced Israeli and US radars, Nasrallah said during a televised speech late on Thursday.

“This is only part of our capabilities,” he stressed, adding that Israelis have admitted to their security failure despite being provided with the latest technologies by Western powers.

 

 

Hezbollah secretary-general stated that Hezbollah’s drones are made in Iran but assembled by the resistance movement.

Iran,Iraq,Syria,Russia :Mission NOT accomplished for Big Oil

23 August 2012

 

Published (with an intro by Tom Engelhardt) on TomDispatch

In 2011, after nearly nine years of war and occupation, U.S. troops finally left Iraq. In their place, Big Oil is now present in force and the country’s oil output, crippled for decades, is growing again. Iraq recently reclaimed the number two position in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), overtaking oil-sanctioned Iran. Now, there’s talk of a new world petroleum glut. So is this finally mission accomplished?

Well, not exactly. In fact, any oil company victory in Iraq is likely to prove as temporary as George W. Bush’s triumph in 2003. The main reason is yet another of those stories the mainstream media didn’t quite find room for: the role of Iraqi civil society. But before telling that story, let’s look at what’s happening to Iraqi oil today, and how we got from the “no blood for oil” global protests of 2003 to the present moment.

Here, as a start, is a little scorecard of what’s gone on in Iraq since Big Oil arrived two and a half years ago: corruption’s skyrocketed; two Western oil companies are being investigated for either giving or receiving bribes; the Iraqi government is paying oil companies a per-barrel fee according to wildly unrealistic production targets they’ve set, whether or not they deliver that number of barrels; contractors are heavily over-charging for drilling wells, which the companies don’t mind since the Iraqi government picks up the tab.

Meanwhile, to protect the oil giants from dissent and protest, trade union offices have been raided, computers seized and equipment smashed, leaders arrested and prosecuted. And that’s just in the oil-rich southern part of the country.

In Kurdistan in the north, the regional government awards contracts on land outside its jurisdiction, contracts which permit the government to transfer its stake in the oil projects — up to 25% — to private companies of its choice. Fuel is smuggled across the border to the tune of hundreds of tankers a day.

In Kurdistan, at least the approach is deliberate: the two ruling families of the region, the Barzanis and Talabanis, know that they can do whatever they like, since their Peshmerga militia control the territory. In contrast, the Iraqi federal government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has little control over anything. As a result, in the rest of the country the oil industry operates, gold-rush-style, in an almost complete absence of oversight or regulation.

Oil companies differ as to which of these two Iraqs they prefer to operate in. BP and Shell have opted to rush for black gold in the super-giant oilfields of southern Iraq. Exxon has hedged its bets by investing in both options. This summer, Chevron and the French oil company Total voted for the Kurdish approach, trading smaller oil fields for better terms and a bit more stability.

Keep in mind that the incapacity of the Iraqi government is hardly limited to the oil business: stagnation hangs over its every institution. Iraqis still have an average of just five hours of electricity a day, which in 130-degree heat causes tempers to boil over regularly. The country’s two great rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, which watered the cradle of civilization 5,000 years ago, are drying up.  This is largely due to the inability of the government to engage in effective regional diplomacy that would control upstream dam-building by Turkey.

After elections in 2010, the country’s leading politicians couldn’t even agree on how to form a government until the Iraqi Supreme Court forced them to. This record of haplessness, along with rampant corruption, significant repression, and a revival of sectarianism can all be traced back to American decisions in the occupation years. Tragically, these persistent ills have manifested themselves in a recent spate of car-bombings and other bloody attacks.

Washington’s Yen for Oil

In the period before and around the invasion, the Bush administration barely mentioned Iraqi oil, describing it reverently only as that country’s “patrimony.” As for the reasons for war, the administration insisted that it had barely noticed Iraq had one-tenth of the world’s oil reserves. But my new book reveals documents I received, marked SECRET/NOFORN, that laid out for the first time pre-war oil plans hatched in the Pentagon by arch-neoconservative Douglas Feith’s Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (EIPG).

In November 2002, four months before the invasion, that planning group came up with a novel idea: it proposed that any American occupation authority not repair war damage to the country’s oil infrastructure, as doing so “could discourage private sector involvement.” In other words, it suggested that the landscape should be cleared of Iraq’s homegrown oil industry to make room for Big Oil.

When the administration worried that this might disrupt oil markets, EIPG came up with a new strategy under which initial repairs would be carried out by KBR, a subsidiary of Halliburton. Long-term contracts with multinational companies, awarded by the U.S. occupation authority, would follow. International law notwithstanding, the EIPG documents noted cheerily that such an approach would put “long-term downward pressure on [the oil] price” and force “questions about Iraq’s future relations with OPEC.”

At the same time, the Pentagon planning group recommended that Washington state that its policy was “not to prejudice Iraq’s future decisions regarding its oil development policies.” Here, in writing, was the approach adopted in the years to come by the Bush administration and the occupation authorities: lie to the public while secretly planning to hand Iraq over to Big Oil.

There turned out, however, to be a small kink in the plan: the oil companies declined the American-awarded contracts, fearing that they would not stand up in international courts and so prove illegitimate. They wanted Iraq first to have an elected permanent government that would arrive at the same results. The question then became how to get the required results with the Iraqis nominally in charge. The answer: install a friendly government and destroy the Iraqi oil industry.

In July 2003, the U.S. occupation established the Iraqi Governing Council, a quasi-governmental body led by friendly Iraqi exiles who had been out of the country for the previous few decades. They would be housed in an area of Baghdad isolated from the Iraqi population by concrete blast walls and machine gun towers, and dubbed the Green Zone.  There, the politicians would feast, oblivious to and unconcerned with the suffering of the rest of the population.

The first post-invasion Oil Minister was Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum, a man who held the country’s homegrown oil expertise in open contempt. He quickly set about sacking the technicians and managers who had built the industry following nationalization in the 1970s and had kept it running through wars and sanctions. He replaced them with friends and fellow party members. One typical replacement was a former pizza chef.

The resulting damage to the oil industry exceeded anything caused by missiles and tanks. As a result the country found itself — as Washington had hoped — dependent on the expertise of foreign companies. Meanwhile, not only did the Coalition Provisional authority (CPA) that oversaw the occupation lose $6.6 billion of Iraqi money, it effectively suggested corruption wasn’t something to worry about.  A December 2003 CPA policy document recommended that Iraq follow the lead of Azerbaijan, where the government had attracted oil multinationals despite an atmosphere of staggering corruption (“less attractive governance”) simply by offering highly profitable deals.

Now, so many years later, the corruption is all-pervasive and the multinationals continue to operate without oversight, since the country’s ministry is run by the equivalent of pizza chefs.

The first permanent government was formed under Prime Minister Maliki in May 2006. In the preceding months, the American and British governments made sure the candidates for prime minister knew what their first priority had to be: to pass a law legalizing the return of the foreign multinationals — tossed out of the country in the 1970s — to run the oil sector.

The law was drafted within weeks, dutifully shown to U.S. officials within days, and to oil multinationals not long after. Members of the Iraqi parliament, however, had to wait seven months to see the text.

How Temporary the Victory of Big Oil?

The trouble was: getting it through that parliament proved far more difficult than Washington or its officials in Iraq had anticipated. In January 2007, an impatient President Bush announced a “surge” of 30,000 U.S. troops into the country, by then wracked by a bloody civil war. Compliant journalists accepted the story of a gamble by General David Petraeus to bring peace to warring Iraqis.

In fact, those troops spearheaded a strategy with rather less altruistic objectives: first, broker a new political deal among U.S. allies, who were the most sectarian and corrupt of Iraq’s politicians (hence, with the irony characteristic of American foreign policy, regularly described as “moderates”); second, pressure them to deliver on political objectives set in Washington and known as “benchmarks” — of which passing the oil law was the only one ever really talked about: in President Bush’s biweekly video conferences with Maliki, in almost daily meetings of the U.S. ambassador in Baghdad, and in frequent visits by senior administration officials.

On this issue, the Democrats, by then increasingly against the Iraq War but still pro-Big Oil, lent a helping hand to a Republican administration. Having failed to end the war, the newly Democrat-controlled Congress passed an appropriations bill that would cut off reconstruction funds to Iraq if the oil law weren’t passed. Generals warned that without an oil law Prime Minister Maliki would lose their support, which he knew well would mean losing his job. And to ramp up the pressure further, the U.S. set a deadline of September 2007 to pass the law or face the consequences.

It was then that things started going really wrong for Bush and company. In December 2006, I was at a meeting where leaders of Iraq’s trade unions decided to fight the oil law. One of them summed up the general sentiment this way: “We do not need thieves to take us back to the middle ages.” So they began organizing. They printed pamphlets, held public meetings and conferences, staged protests, and watched support for their movement grow.

Most Iraqis feel strongly that the country’s oil reserves belong in the public sector, to be developed to benefit them, not foreign energy companies. And so word spread fast — and with it, popular anger. Iraq’s oil professionals and various civil society groups denounced the law. Preachers railed against it in Friday sermons. Demonstrations were held in Baghdad and elsewhere, and as Washington ratcheted up the pressure, members of the Iraqi parliament started to see political opportunity in aligning themselves with this ever more popular cause. Even some U.S. allies in Parliament confided in diplomats at the American embassy that it would be political suicide to vote for the law.

By the September deadline, a majority of the parliament was against the law and — a remarkable victory for the trade unions — it was not passed. It’s still not passed today.

Given the political capital the Bush administration had invested in the passage of the oil law, its failure offered Iraqis a glimpse of the limits of U.S. power, and from that moment on, Washington’s influence began to wane.

Things changed again in 2009 when the Maliki government, eager for oil revenues, began awarding contracts to them even without an oil law in place. As a result, however, the victory of Big Oil is likely to be a temporary one: the present contracts are illegal, and so they will last only as long as there’s a government in Baghdad that supports them.

This helps explain why the government’s repression of trade unions increased once the contracts were signed.  Now, Iraq is showing signs of a more general return to authoritarianism (as well as internecine violence and possibly renewed sectarian conflict).

But there is another possibility for Iraq. Years before the Arab Spring, I saw what Iraqi civil society can achieve by organizing: it stopped the world’s superpower from reaching its main objective and steered Iraq onto a more positive course.

Many times since 2003 Iraqis have moved their country in a more democratic direction: establishing trade unions in that year, building Shi’a-Sunni connections in 2004, promoting anti-sectarian politicians in 2007 and 2008, and voting for them in 2009.  Sadly, each of these times Washington has pushed it back toward sectarianism, the atmosphere in which its allies thrive.  While mainstream commentators now regularly blame the recent escalation of violence on the departure of U.S. troops, it would be more accurate to say that the real reason is they didn’t leave far sooner.

Now, without its troops and bases, much of Washington’s political heft has vanished. Whether Iraq heads in the direction of dictatorship, sectarianism, or democracy remains to be seen, but if Iraqis again start to build a more democratic future, the U.S. will no longer be there to obstruct it.  Meanwhile, if a new politics does emerge, Big Oil may discover that, in the end, it was mission unaccomplished. [source]

Putin backs Russian push for Iraqi oil

 

President Vladimir Putin lobbied Iraq’s prime minister on Wednesday to support Russian energy investment, as the oil arm of gas export monopoly Gazprom (GAZP.MM) pushes for a foothold in the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan.

Gazprom Neft (SIBN.MM) is still interested in Kurdistan’s oil, company sources and the province’s spokesman said, rebutting reports it had frozen projects in the Iraqi province.

Putin, a vocal opponent of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, called for Russia to strengthen its presence in the OPEC oil producer state at talks with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki at his residence near Moscow.

“Our companies are boosting their activities in Iraq – the whole list of our large energy companies,” Putin said. “I hope their work will develop step by step and we are very much hoping for your support, Mr Prime Minister.”

Russia’s second-largest crude producer LUKOIL (LKOH.MM) is developing the vast West Qurna-2 oil, while mid-sized Bashneft (BANE.MM) is teaming up with Britain’s Premier Oil PLC (PMO.L) after they won the right to tap oil in the Middle East country.

LUKOIL bought Norway’s Statoil (STL.OL) out of their partnership in West Qurna-2 in March, and CEO Vagit Alekperov said he would be open to taking on board a new partner.

“We bought it, 100 pct, if there is a good offer we can sell part of it, so far we feel comfortable with it,” Alekperov told Reuters. Asked if there was an offer in the works, he said “at the moment no, only outline ideas.”

Russia signed $4.2 billion worth of arms deals with Iraq on Tuesday.

DEAL NOT FROZEN

Late on Tuesday, the International Oil Daily cited Iraqi Oil Minister Abdul-Kareem Luaibi as saying Baghdad had received a letter from Gazprom, in which the company said it had frozen its contract with Kurdistan.

Baghdad has been angered by the plans of some international majors, including ExxonMobil (XOM.N), to tap oil and gas in the northern region. The central government says the deals are illegal.

A spokesman for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) said Gazprom Neft had informed the KRG on Wednesday that it remains committed to its contract in the Kurdistan region.

Sources at Gazprom Neft also knocked down the report.

In August, Gazprom Neft acquired interests in two blocks in Kurdistan.

“Gazprom Neft is still working on these projects. The company keeps its interest in Kurdistan,” a Gazprom Neft source told Reuters.

Another source at the company said Gazprom Neft would be able to go ahead with the projects once the Iraqi central government and KRG resolve their differences.

He also said Gazprom Neft management will travel to Kurdistan before year-end to discuss oil development in the province. A company spokeswoman declined to comment.

Gazprom Neft already has a project in Iraq, near the Iranian border, where it expects to produce about 15,000 barrels per day from 2013. [source ]

 

And the other side “de la moneda” Judge for yourselves

 

October 11, 2012 

Iraq today stands on the brink of total control by Iran and the establishment of a new dictatorship. 

The dream for which so many American soldiers believed they were fighting is slipping away as Iraq moves in the opposite direction – toward Iran. 

Iran’s presence is already visible in Iraq, from the droves of pilgrims at Shi’ite holy sites to the brands of yogurt and jam on grocery shelves, and Iraqis see clear Iranian influence since the US troops left at the end of last year. 

It could be considered a natural step for the only two Shi’ite Muslim-led governments in the Sunnidominated Middle East to expand their relationship. However, many Iraqi Shi’ites are cautious of intrusion of their country’s sovereignty and afraid of being overrun by the Iranian theocracy. 

Iraqis are accusing Iran of meddling in Iraqi affairs to destabilize the new democracy and strengthen Iran’s influence over it and its neighbors. Top Iranian officials maintain they are only strengthening diplomatic and economic ties with Iraq, as they have sought to do since the 2003 ouster of Saddam Hussein. On the other hand, head of Iranian al-Quds Brigades General Qasim Sulaimani announced recently that Iraq and South Lebanon are submissive to Tehran’s will, stating that his country could regulate any movement with the aim to form Islamic governments in both countries. 

Not to mention the close relationship between Iran and Syria. This is the goal of the Iranians: to form the Shi’ite crescent – Iran, Iraq, Syria and Southern Lebanon – controlled by Hezbollah. The aim is to encircle Israel. Israel should worry about Iraq acquiring F-16 aircraft from the United States, especially since their pilots will be selected from among the Shi’ites most loyal to the regime in Tehran. “Iran wants to make Iraq a weak state,” said Maj.- Gen. Jeffrey S. Buchanan, a US military spokesman in Iraq, a few years ago. 

This issue has also worried many American officials who have long feared what they described as Iranian meddling in Iraq and its potential to sow unrest across the Middle East. Those worries were a chief driver of failed efforts to leave at least several thousand American troops in Iraq beyond the end of last year’s withdrawal deadline. 

“The more you think about it, the more examples there are of Iranian influence,” says Buchanan. “They’re circumstantial, but that’s how behind-thescenes influence works.” Since Iraq’s 2010 election, Iraqis have witnessed the subordination of the state to Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki’s Iranian-backed Da’awa party, the erosion of judicial independence and intimidation of opponents. All of this happened during the Arab Spring while other countries were ousting dictators in favor of democracy. Iraq has become a sectarian battleground in which identity politics have crippled democratic development. 

Maliki has laid siege to his political opponents’ homes and offices, surrounded them with his security forces, all with the blessing of politicized judiciary and law enforcement systems that have become virtual extensions of his personal office. 

This is a typical textbook definition of “lawfare.” His national security adviser has complete control over the Iraqi intelligence and national security agencies, which are supposed to be independent institutions but have become a virtual extension of Maliki’s Da’awa Party; and his Da’awa loyalists are in control of the security units that oversee the Green Zone. The Iraqi prime minister uses secret prisons under the supervision of his elite security apparatus, and the Red Cross has conclusive evidence about these prisons. 

It was stated in its recent report that there is evidence detainees being tortured to extract confessions and information. The report mentioned that some of the torture sessions were attended by Iraqi judges. The Red Cross reported that there are three secret prisons in the Green Zone alone that are linked to Maliki’s office. The political process in Iraq is going in a very wrong direction; it’s going toward a dictatorship, while Iran views Maliki as its man in Baghdad and has dictated the shape of the current government. 

This Shi’ite Islamist government bodes ill for the country’s future. Today in Iraq, we see Maliki silencing and eliminating his opponents, using the law as a silent weapon for a quiet war. MALIKI IS using the judicial system to attack his political opponents, and the security services in Iraq have become part of the problem as they have been proven to be managing secret detention centers where torture is practiced under the personal supervision of the Office of the Prime Minister. It was revealed recently that 36 out of 38 inspectors-general at Iraqi ministries are from Maliki’s Da’awa Party. 

What we also see in Iraq now is that Iraq supports Syria, weapons from Iran being transported to Syria through Iraq, violations of UN security council resolutions against Iran and money laundering through Iraqi banks in favor of Iran with the full knowledge and support of the Office of the Prime Minister. The Iranian government played an important role in the revitalization of money laundering in Iraq by private banks in coordination with the Office of the Prime Minister. Armed groups backed by Tehran receive millions of dollars monthly in salaries and benefits from Iraqi banks under the guise of bank transfers or investment projects or grants to civil society organizations. It has been confirmed that Tehran-backed armed groups present in southern, central and northern Iraq are dealing with specific banks in these areas and receive their funds facilitated by the Da’awa Party. By consistently thinking of Maliki as a Shi’ite rather than an Iraqi Arab, American officials overlooked opportunities that once existed in Iraq but are now gone. Thanks to their own flawed policies, the Iraq they left behind is more similar to the desperate and divided country of 2006 than to the optimistic Iraq of early 2009. When American forces withdrew from Iraq at the end of last year, it was thought that they would be leaving behind a country that was politically unstable, increasingly volatile, and at risk of descending into the sort of sectarian fighting that killed thousands in 2006 and 2007. Nothing like this actually happened or will happen; instead we see Iraq falling under the full control of Iran. It is controlled by Iran’s embassy in Baghdad and its many consulates in other Iraqi cities. From a strategic standpoint, one can say that Iraq, with all its territory and capabilities, has become Iran’s strategic depth, supplementing its regional expansion. 

Iran controls the political decision-making and economy of Iraq. For all of its potential, Iraq has become merely an advanced strategic base for Iran. Iran may want to strike Israel via Hezbollah, and Iraq, due to its geographical location and the nature of the ruling powers, will be a key player in this regard. 

This is especially true when we observe in Iraq today that there is education, promoted by the Shi’ite parties linked to Iran, saying that the expulsion of Jews from the land of Palestine will be only at the hands of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It should also be noted that Iran is not crazy enough to attack the Gulf States and risk losing its legitimacy, as happened with Iraq when it invaded Kuwait. Iran must not be seen attacking Muslim states, which will antagonize the Muslim world. Iran will certainly target Israel first; this is the issue, aided by warmongering media campaigns, that would garner sympathy for Iran among the ignorant people of the Islamic world.[source]

[…]

 

So true,so genuine that I still can’t find a title for the post:) and i have the same question,the picture is from Twitter 😀 not funny but made me smile

 

BP Entry contract for Rumaila field

Fourth release, 31 July 2011

During the second half of 2009, Iraq held two auctions of its largest oilfields, awarding them to multinational companies such as BP, Shell and ExxonMobil to operate under 20-year contracts. Between them the oilfields account for over 60% of Iraq’s reserves. The contracts were service contracts rather than the companies’ preferred production sharing agreements, which had been proposed for Iraq but rejected as giving too much away.

Media reports of the auction focused on the headline remuneration fees. These sounded so low – between $1.15 and $5.50 per barrel – that many commentators questioned the profitability of the deals. But as always in oil contracts, the devil is in the detail. And whereas the auctions were billed by the Iraqi government as among the world’s most transparent contracting processes, the first contract, for the super-giant Rumaila field near Basra, was privately renegotiated between the Iraqi government and the winning BP/CNPC consortium for more than three months after the auction.The result was that the terms changed significantly from the published model contract on which the auction was based, to  make it much more attractive to BP and CNPC, at the expense of the Iraqi people.

• We have obtained the renegotiated Rumaila contract, and can reveal its contents for the first time. The major changes are explained in the report “From Glass Box to Smoke Filled Room – How BP secretly renegotiated its Iraqi oil contract, and how Iraqis will pay the price”, written by Fuel on the Fire author Greg Muttitt and published by PLATFORM.

NEW REPORT: From Glass Box to Smoke Filled Room.

View this document on Scribd

DOCUMENT 12: the original model contract, on which the auction was based.
DOCUMENT 13: the leaked, renegotiated contract, which was actually signed.

Also in today’s release:

• Another document released today reveals the possible reason BP was so successful in changing the terms in its favour, by focusing on the detailed terms of the contract. In April 2009, Ministry of Oil officials travelled to the UK to explore how to meet their training needs. Just two months before the auction, foremost among the areas where they sought training were commercial and negotiating skills. And the training provider they went to? BP!

DOCUMENT 14: Letter from BP to Iraq Ministry of Oil, 28 April 2009.

• The contracts were opposed by many in Iraq, including oil experts, the management of the South Oil Company (which would have to work with BP on the Rumaila field), the oil trade union and the parliamentary oil and gas committee. When parliamentarians called in the Iraqi Oil Minister for questioning about the contract, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki wrote to the speaker of parliament to warn against the move. In the private and confidential letter, released today, he told the speaker that he would consider such questioning to be “in harmony” with recent major terrorist bombings in Baghdad.

DOCUMENT 15: Letter from Nouri al-Maliki to parliament, October 2009 (Arabic original)

DOCUMENT 16: Letter from Nouri al-Maliki to parliament, October 2009 (English translation)

u.s. prewar planning to privatize iraq’s oil, 2002-3

Fifth release, July 17, 2012

(See also today’s press release)

Two documents are published today, revealing for the first time the role of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group, whose purpose was to plan for the running of Iraq’s oil industry during the period of direct U.S. occupation and administration of Iraq (under the CPA of Paul Bremer, as it became).

EIPG was established in summer 2002 by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith. It was led by Michael Mobbs, a political appointee in the Department of Defense. The other members were Michael Makovsy of the Department of Defense, Seneca Johnson of the Department of State, Clark Turner of the Department of Energy (Strategic Petroleum Reserve) and a CIA analyst.

The EIPG did the thinking behind the subject, and made recommendations to the Deputies and Principals Committees of the National Security Council (comprising the heads and second-in-commands of the government agencies relevant to national security).

They were obtained from the Department of Defense under the Freedom of Information Act. This is the first clear evidence, more than nine years on, that Bush administration officials were planning before the war to open the way to multinational oil companies, an assertion consistently denied by the government.

DOCUMENT 17: a briefing to the Deputies Committee on November 6, 2002.  The main topic of the meeting is how to spend the proceeds from Iraqi oil.

See especially page 10, where weighing up whether to repair war-damaged Iraqi oil infrastructure, one of the cons is that it “could deter private sector involvement”. Although this route was rejected (see DOCUMENT 18), it could later be seen in the U.S. forces’ failure to stop looting of the infrastructure in April 2003 (they only protected the Oil Ministry building, which held the irreplaceable geological data – they did nothing to protect drill rigs, pump stations etc). The attitude was seen again when the Oil Ministry’s considerable human resources were cleared out in fall 2003, in favor of friends and family of the new oil minister.

Note also on the contents page (2) the EIPG planned to consider later that month “whether to use control of Iraqi oil to advance important U.S. foreign policy objectives”. DOD reports that it holds no record of such discussions. They are likely to involve not direct U.S. energy interests, but whether to tear up eg Russian and Chinese contracts in order to harm those countries.

(The briefing was stored by the DOD as landscape printed on portrait paper – hence the edges are cut off in the official archive too!).
DOCUMENT 18: a briefing to the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on January 11, 2003, incorporating comments and decisions from earlier Deputies meetings.

Here the option of leaving war damage unrepaired so as to make room for Big Oil has been rejected, in favor of appointing Halliburton subsidiary KBR to carry out repairs (page 5).

Priorities are set of restoring crude oil production (which the USA needed) over electricity and fuel (which Iraqis needed – page 6).

Increasing Iraqi production to 5 million barrels per day (from 2.5m bpd)  is favored as it “helps consumers” and “puts long-term downward pressure on the oil price”

Strikingly, “pubic diplomacy” (page 4) means the message that would be given to the public, including saying that “we will act… so as not to prejudice Iraq’s future decisions” – even though the opposite is proposed as substantive policy. In other words, the briefing recommends that the Bush administration mislead the public on how it would approach Iraqi oil.

Oil Wars : The BP entry in Iraq [rare documentation]

oil company – government meetings, 2002-3

First Release, 27 April 2011

These five documents are minutes of meetings about Iraq between the UK government and oil companies BP and Shell, ion the six months before the war. They were reported in the Independent on 19 April 2011.

The documents do not demonstrate that oil was the reason for the war. But they do show that during the preparations for war, oil was a central concern for the UK government, disproving its claims that it was not interested in Iraq’s oil.

The documents also provide a remarkable insight into the interaction between oil companies and government, at the highest levels. We see that the government needed no persuasion that it should help the companies – the civil servants clearly saw themselves as on the same side as the oilmen. The companies could barely contain their excitement about Iraq – “the big oil prospect”, as BP put it in one meeting (DOCUMENT 3) – and the tone is quite unlike that usually seen in minutes of government meetings. The companies and government officials alike had no doubt that a war would take place, months before the parliamentary vote and while the government struggling (unsuccessfully) to persuade the UN Security Council to pass resolution authorising the war.

From the company perspective, the main purpose of the meetings was to ensure that they got their share (as they saw it) of Iraqi oilfields after the war. They were especially worried that the US government would naturally favour US companies, and might offer other fields to French, Russian or Chinese companies in exchange for their governments’ support in the UN Security Council. Tony Blair had already pledged British participation in the war, and so the British companies feared that with no bargaining power they’d be left out.

Trade Minister Baroness Symons – a staunch Blairite and active member of the British American Project, which had aimed since the 1980s to align the Labour Party’s foreign policy with that of the USA – was present in two of the meetings. She said [DOCUMENT 2] that “It would be difficult to justify British companies losing out in Iraq in that way if the UK had itself been a conspicuous supporter of the US government throughout the crisis”. In other words, if British forces fight in a war then British companies should get a share of the spoils. This view is clearly unethical, but is also arguably illegal, under the Fourth Hague Convention.

BP and Shell both claimed that no such meetings took place. These minutes show such claims to be untrue. When invited to explain the discrepancy, both companies declined to comment. For her part, Symons said to Parliament in April 2003 that Iraq’s oil was “the patrimony of the people of Iraq, which should be used for their benefit, and for their benefit alone” – this was not what she said in private to the oil companies.

For more commentary on these documents, including the companies’ objectives and their history of deals with the Saddam regime, please see Chapter Four of Fuel on the Fire. For more on the UK and US governments’ strategic oil objectives, please see Chapter Three.

• DOCUMENT  1 – Meeting of Edward Chaplin (Middle East Director, Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)) with Tony Wildig (Senior Vice President for New Business in Middle East, Shell), 2 October 2002.

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Chaplin: “Shell and BP could not afford not to have a stake in it for the sake of their long-term future… We were determined to get a fair slice of the action for UK companies in a post-Saddam Iraq.”

DOCUMENT 2 – Meeting of Baroness Liz Symons (Trade Minister) with representatives of BP (Richard Paniguian, Tony Renton), Shell (John Withrington, Gavin Graham) and BG (Bethell), 31 October 2002.

BP: Iraq “would provide an immense strategic advantage to any company which emerged in a commanding position”

Symons: “Anything of this nature would be highly sensitive and kept very close”.

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DOCUMENT 3 – Meeting of Michael Arthur (Head of Economic Policy, FCO) with Richard Paniguian (Group Vice President for Russia, the Caspian, Middle East and Africa), 6 November 2002.

“Iraq is the big oil prospect. BP are desperate to get in there.”

BP: “Vitally important – more important than anything we’ve seen for a long time.”

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DOCUMENT 4 – Meeting of Baroness Symons with Richard Paniguian and Tony Renton (Commercial Director Middle East, BP), 4 December 2002

Discussion of US planning efforts for Iraqi oil. “It was clear that Ahmad Chalabi, the leader of the INC [Iraq National Congress] had a key role in selecting who was involved in these groups”.
“BP believed that the US authorities need to start giving some serious consideration to a number of issues on the future of Iraq’s oil industry including Iraq’s role in OPEC, the role of both existing and future Oil Ministry and State Owned Oil Company.”
Note that BP wanted more involvement of Iraqi expertise – presumably for greater stability for any investment.

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DOCUMENT 5 – Meeting of John Browne (Chief Executive, BP) with Michael Jay (Permanent Undersecretary, FCO), 18 March 2003

This meeting took place less than 48 hours before bombs started falling on Baghdad, at the highest level: the head of BP with the most senior civil servant in the FCO. Of Jay’s five predecessors in that role, four had become directors of oil and gas companies on retirement from government service (two at Shell and one each at BP and BG).
BP had a team ready. But in the longer-term development of Iraq’s oilfields “They would not wish to be involved unless they were clear that administrative and other structures were in place to ensure that their involvement would be acceptable to whatever government followed military action”. This political conservatism by the major oil companies would shape the evolution of Iraqi oil policy during the early years of the occupation. Note however that Browne did not apparently make the more common point that such deals would have to be legal.

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british government strategy papers on iraqi oil, 2003-4

Second Release – 27 April 2011

These three documents set out the British government’s objectives for Iraqi oil, and its strategies for how to achieve them. They were reported in the Independent on 20 April 2011.

The documents stand in stark contrast to public claims by the government that it had no interest in Iraq’s oil. For example, Tony Blair said in February 2003 that “The oil conspiracy theory is honestly one of the most absurd when you analyse it.” Three months later, a Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) strategy paper (DOCUMENT 6) would declare, “The future shape of the Iraqi oil industry will affect oil markets, and the functioning of OPEC, in both of which we have a vital interest.” That paper was written less than two weeks after President Bush declared “mission accomplished” on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln.
The nature of British and American interests in Iraqi and Middle Eastern oil is explored in Chapter 3 of Fuel on the Fire. It is not as simple as to ‘take the oil’ (as Donald Trump has been saying over the last few weeks as a launchpad for his presidential campaign). And nor is it just about getting contracts for their own companies, although that was a secondary aim, as discussed in the pre-war Whitehall meetings. The most important strategic interest lay in expanding global energy supplies, through foreign investment, in some of the world’s largest oil reserves – in particular Iraq. This meshed neatly with the secondary aim of securing contracts for their companies. Note that the strategy documents released here tend to refer to “British and global energy supplies”. British energy security is to be obtained by there being ample global supplies – it is not about the specific flow, as if physical Iraqi oil goes to China rather than Europe, another source (say, in Africa) can be re-rerouted from China to Europe in its place.
Chapters 9 and 11 of Fuel on the Fire look at how Britain and the USA sought to achieve their oil objectives during the early years of the occupation (before the formation of a permanent government in 2006). Those chapters contextualise and interpret these three British strategy documents; they also reflect on the favoured euphemism of “advice” (which implies that Iraqi leaders were independently able to take or leave the advice).
DOCUMENT 6 – Iraqi oil and British interests, FCO paper, 12 May 2003

As its title suggests, this document is quite blunt about British interests, not bothering to dress up its proposals as being in Iraqi interests. And it notes the interplay between British energy security and commercial interests.

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DOCUMENT 7 – Management change in the Iraqi oil sector, 27 May 2003

Two weeks later, this document was prepared for an interdepartment meeting of the government’s Oil Sector Liaison Group, comprising officials from the FCO, the Treasury, the Department of Trade & Industry and the Department for International Development.
Unlike the previous document, this expresses its aims as being in the interests of Iraqis – yet of the seven items in the objectives list on page 4, five are quite plainly British rather than Iraqi concerns. Even the other two (the 4th and 5th) are only what outsiders imagine Iraqi concerns to be, rather inaccurately.
Note especially the aim for Iraq to be a role model for the other major oil countries in the region, and the call for it to remain within OPEC but as an advocate of lower oil prices.

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DOCUMENT 8 – UK Energy Strategy for Iraq, September 2004

This too was an interdepartmental paper, and is quite clear about how Britain would influence the evolving Iraqi oil policy. Note especially the recognition that Iraqis won’t like the plans.

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