BP Entry contract for Rumaila field

Fourth release, 31 July 2011

During the second half of 2009, Iraq held two auctions of its largest oilfields, awarding them to multinational companies such as BP, Shell and ExxonMobil to operate under 20-year contracts. Between them the oilfields account for over 60% of Iraq’s reserves. The contracts were service contracts rather than the companies’ preferred production sharing agreements, which had been proposed for Iraq but rejected as giving too much away.

Media reports of the auction focused on the headline remuneration fees. These sounded so low – between $1.15 and $5.50 per barrel – that many commentators questioned the profitability of the deals. But as always in oil contracts, the devil is in the detail. And whereas the auctions were billed by the Iraqi government as among the world’s most transparent contracting processes, the first contract, for the super-giant Rumaila field near Basra, was privately renegotiated between the Iraqi government and the winning BP/CNPC consortium for more than three months after the auction.The result was that the terms changed significantly from the published model contract on which the auction was based, to  make it much more attractive to BP and CNPC, at the expense of the Iraqi people.

• We have obtained the renegotiated Rumaila contract, and can reveal its contents for the first time. The major changes are explained in the report “From Glass Box to Smoke Filled Room – How BP secretly renegotiated its Iraqi oil contract, and how Iraqis will pay the price”, written by Fuel on the Fire author Greg Muttitt and published by PLATFORM.

NEW REPORT: From Glass Box to Smoke Filled Room.

View this document on Scribd

DOCUMENT 12: the original model contract, on which the auction was based.
DOCUMENT 13: the leaked, renegotiated contract, which was actually signed.

Also in today’s release:

• Another document released today reveals the possible reason BP was so successful in changing the terms in its favour, by focusing on the detailed terms of the contract. In April 2009, Ministry of Oil officials travelled to the UK to explore how to meet their training needs. Just two months before the auction, foremost among the areas where they sought training were commercial and negotiating skills. And the training provider they went to? BP!

DOCUMENT 14: Letter from BP to Iraq Ministry of Oil, 28 April 2009.

• The contracts were opposed by many in Iraq, including oil experts, the management of the South Oil Company (which would have to work with BP on the Rumaila field), the oil trade union and the parliamentary oil and gas committee. When parliamentarians called in the Iraqi Oil Minister for questioning about the contract, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki wrote to the speaker of parliament to warn against the move. In the private and confidential letter, released today, he told the speaker that he would consider such questioning to be “in harmony” with recent major terrorist bombings in Baghdad.

DOCUMENT 15: Letter from Nouri al-Maliki to parliament, October 2009 (Arabic original)

DOCUMENT 16: Letter from Nouri al-Maliki to parliament, October 2009 (English translation)

u.s. prewar planning to privatize iraq’s oil, 2002-3

Fifth release, July 17, 2012

(See also today’s press release)

Two documents are published today, revealing for the first time the role of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group, whose purpose was to plan for the running of Iraq’s oil industry during the period of direct U.S. occupation and administration of Iraq (under the CPA of Paul Bremer, as it became).

EIPG was established in summer 2002 by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith. It was led by Michael Mobbs, a political appointee in the Department of Defense. The other members were Michael Makovsy of the Department of Defense, Seneca Johnson of the Department of State, Clark Turner of the Department of Energy (Strategic Petroleum Reserve) and a CIA analyst.

The EIPG did the thinking behind the subject, and made recommendations to the Deputies and Principals Committees of the National Security Council (comprising the heads and second-in-commands of the government agencies relevant to national security).

They were obtained from the Department of Defense under the Freedom of Information Act. This is the first clear evidence, more than nine years on, that Bush administration officials were planning before the war to open the way to multinational oil companies, an assertion consistently denied by the government.

DOCUMENT 17: a briefing to the Deputies Committee on November 6, 2002.  The main topic of the meeting is how to spend the proceeds from Iraqi oil.

See especially page 10, where weighing up whether to repair war-damaged Iraqi oil infrastructure, one of the cons is that it “could deter private sector involvement”. Although this route was rejected (see DOCUMENT 18), it could later be seen in the U.S. forces’ failure to stop looting of the infrastructure in April 2003 (they only protected the Oil Ministry building, which held the irreplaceable geological data – they did nothing to protect drill rigs, pump stations etc). The attitude was seen again when the Oil Ministry’s considerable human resources were cleared out in fall 2003, in favor of friends and family of the new oil minister.

Note also on the contents page (2) the EIPG planned to consider later that month “whether to use control of Iraqi oil to advance important U.S. foreign policy objectives”. DOD reports that it holds no record of such discussions. They are likely to involve not direct U.S. energy interests, but whether to tear up eg Russian and Chinese contracts in order to harm those countries.

(The briefing was stored by the DOD as landscape printed on portrait paper – hence the edges are cut off in the official archive too!).
DOCUMENT 18: a briefing to the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on January 11, 2003, incorporating comments and decisions from earlier Deputies meetings.

Here the option of leaving war damage unrepaired so as to make room for Big Oil has been rejected, in favor of appointing Halliburton subsidiary KBR to carry out repairs (page 5).

Priorities are set of restoring crude oil production (which the USA needed) over electricity and fuel (which Iraqis needed – page 6).

Increasing Iraqi production to 5 million barrels per day (from 2.5m bpd)  is favored as it “helps consumers” and “puts long-term downward pressure on the oil price”

Strikingly, “pubic diplomacy” (page 4) means the message that would be given to the public, including saying that “we will act… so as not to prejudice Iraq’s future decisions” – even though the opposite is proposed as substantive policy. In other words, the briefing recommends that the Bush administration mislead the public on how it would approach Iraqi oil.

BP’s Secret Caspian Sea Blowout Foreshadowed The Gulf Oil Spill

 

BP, government leaders, and other oil executives covered up a secret blowout in the Caspian Sea two years before the Gulf spill caused by the same reason.

BBC investigative reporter and Guardian reporter Greg Palast reveals shocking details about a secret blowout that BP covered up which occurred on the Central Azeri platform of the coast of Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea two years prior to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout.

Greg reveals how he was contacted by a source and then flew to Azerbaijan to document BP’s cover up of the blowout which was caused by a blowout in the cement used when drilling the well, just like during the BP Gulf Oil Spill.

Greg learned that the Caspian blowout was die to the use of a quick drying cement that is highly prone to failure when exposed to gases, such as methane, during the drilling process.

For that reason, following the Caspian Sea blowout, the use of the quick drying cement should have been discontinued in the use of deep-sea drilling operations.

Yet BP continued to recklessly use it anyway for the sake of being able to increase profits and cut costs by drilling wells faster.

Two years later when the Deepwater Horizon Blowout occurred BP played dumb and pointed fingers at Halliburton for the cement job failure even going as far as testifying under oath before Congress they didn’t know cement could fail.

Meanwhile, Halliburton who did the cement job for BP on the well, pointed fingers at BP saying as a contractor performing all work according to BP’s specifications they were not responsible.

These new revelations reveal that BP knew full well the cement would fail and the Caspian blowout taught them full well what the risks were the next time a well failed.

Adding insult to injury, the media ran repeated footage of BP and other Big Oil executive’s testifying before congress that the BP Gulf Oil Spill was unprecedented and nothing like this had ever happened in history.

Even more sickening, as documented by Wikileaks ambassador cables showed in the interview, is the entire time these psychopaths where lying to congress on national televisions, the U.S. government and other world leaders knew about the Azerbaijan blowout.

BP committed what is nothing less than reckless manslaughter if not outright second degree murder of 11 people when the rig exploded.

Congress and other oil executives help them to cover it and it was all to achieve nothing more than being able save money by drilling wells faster.

Meanwhile, the Gulf remains pollution with oil still washing up on shore as giant plumes float beneath the water’s surface and massive slicks continue to be spotted coming from the site site of the blowout

The BP Gulf Oil Spill Cover Up Continues! Watch the entire interview.

READ THE REST OF THE ARTICLE

 

Oopsie..BP Owes $192 Billion for Gulf Oil Disaster

 

On Friday, the Financial Times reported that BP is hoping to reach an agreement with U.S. authorities which would require it to pay under $15 billion to settle all criminal and civil penalties arising from the 2010 Gulf oil disaster. The Department of Justice is reportedly seeking $20 to $25 billion. Negotiations between the DOJ and BP are accelerating and “an agreement could be reached before the Democratic party’s convention in September,” the FT reported.

While $15 billion sounds like a lot of money — and it is — it is a far cry from what BP owes for the many costs associated with the largest offshore oil spill in history. To date, a full accounting of exactly what BP should owe for its crimes in the Gulf has not been made public. Such an accounting is vital if we are to ensure that justice and restoration are delivered to the Gulf Coast and that such a catastrophe never occurs again.

A straightforward application of just the most pertinent U.S. laws yields a fine of $192 billion. (For simplicity sake, I only address BP’s fines.)

Sound high? Here’s why it’s not.

Seaman’s Manslaughter Statute = $2.75 – $5.5 million

Eleven men died aboard the Deepwater Horizon: Gordon Jones, Dewey Revette, Jason Anderson, Shane Roshto, Stephen Curtis, Blair Manuel, Karl Kleppinger, Adam Weise, Don Clark, Roy Kemp, and Aaron Dale Burkeen. Title 18 Section 1115 of the U.S. Criminal Code, the “Seaman’s Manslaughter Statute,” holds companies, executives, managers, and employees of vessels liable for fines and imprisonment for deaths occurring on their rigs. Simple negligence (not intent) is enough to secure a conviction. The conclusions of numerous critical investigations make negligence a forgone conclusion in this case. Criminal penalties include up to 10 years imprisonment per violation and fines. Individual fine: $250,000 per violation x 11 = $2.75 million. Company fine: $500,000 x 11 = $5.5 million.

Clean Water Act: $30.5 billion

Clean Water Act (CWA): “… no discharges of oil or hazardous substances into or upon the navigable waters of the United States…” “Hazardous substances” are “… such elements and compounds which, when discharged in any quantity… present an imminent and substantial danger to… including, but not limited to, fish, shellfish, wildlife…”

4.9 million barrels of oil was released from the Macondo well, while .8 million barrels were captured at wellhead, and therefore did not escape into the water. The CWA imposes a fine of $1,100 per barrel for the mere act of spilling oil into the water. A spill that is the result of negligence, as is the case here, entails a $4,300 per barrel spilled fine is imposed. 4.1 million barrels of oil x $4,300 per barrel = $17.63 billion.

500,000 tonnes of gaseous hydrocarbons (including methane gas) were also released (3 million barrels of oil equivalent). Just as excessive oil is a hazardous pollutant, so too is excessive gas which depletes the oxygen Gulf waters need to support life, such as fish, shellfish, and wildlife. 3 x $4,300 per barrel = $12.9 billion.

Alternative Fines Act (AFA)
Dr. David Uhlmann, former head of the U.S. Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Section, argues for criminal charges against BP under the CWA, making BP liable under the Alternative Fines Act (AFA) to be fined double the losses caused. Dr. Uhlmann argues for application of the AFA to at least all economic losses and natural resource damages.

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: $37 million

The Interior Department cited BP for 12 violations of drilling rules @ $35,000 per violation for 87 days = 36.54 million.

To calculate fines under the Endangered Species, Marine Mammal Protection, and Migratory Bird Treaty Acts below, I used the latest data on species deaths provided by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Association, supplemented by “A Deadly Toll: The Gulf Oil Spill and the Unfolding Wildlife Disaster,” Center for Biological Diversity, April 2011. I use the latter to provide “multipliers” to account for estimates of the dead not found versus those recovered. I apply the highest possible fines, criminal charges, because this is a “knowing” offense: BP and its partners took so many risks that they knew such a disaster might reasonably occur.

Endangered Species Act: $284 million

Approximately 5680 injured or dead endangered or threatened species, including 100 sperm whales and over 6,000 sea turtles. @ $50,000 each = $284 million.

Marine Mammal Protection Act: $60 million

Data from April 2011 finds 26,000 marine mammals directly injured or killed. But hundreds more dolphins have since been found. Applying the standard multiplier for those impacted but still at sea, 30,000 is more likely. @ $20,000 fine per impacted mammal = $60 million.

Migratory Bird Treaty Act: $9.4 million

Some 82,000 birds were identified as injured or dead, including more than 8,200 brown pelicans and 30,000 Laughing Gulls. The species of some 6,000 birds was unknown, and therefore it is unknown if they are migratory.

The Migratory Bird Treaty Act: 73 bird species harmed by spill are migratory, totaling 18,770 birds, including nearly 5,000 Northern Gannets, 3,000 Royal Terns and 220 Snowy Egrets. @ $500 per bird = $9.4 million.

Oil Pollution Act (OPA) = $152 Billion

Under the 1990 OPA, BP is responsible for stopping the spill; cleaning up the pollution; a Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA); full environmental restoration; and full victim compensation.

Natural Resource Damage Assessment: $62 billion ($31B x 2 [AFA])
The NRDA process is underway and we will not know for decades the full impact of the disaster. Thus, for numbers, I turn to the National Wildlife Federation which used the Exxon Valdez settlement as precedent. Exxon paid $152 (adjusted for inflation) per-gallon of oil spilled for restoration. $152 x 4.1 million barrels of oil = $31 billion.

This may be an extreme underestimation. While the oil carried by the Valdez was heavier and more polluting and the weather colder and therefore less likely to allow the oil to evaporate, BP’s spill was nearly 20 times larger; impacted five states, each with much larger populations than Alaska; harmed a much larger, more fragile, and diverse ecosystem; took place for a significantly longer period of time; and involved dramatically more chemical dispersant. Moreover, after 30 years, restoration in the Prince William Sound has not been achieved.

Economic Loss: $79 billion ($39.7B x 2 [AFA])

Fisheries = $30 billion
From 2009 to 2010, in Louisiana and Mississippi, oyster production fell 55% and 34%, respectively; shrimp declined in Mississippi by 52%, in Alabama by 48%, and in Louisiana, by 14%. 2011 data is not yet available, but, as I reported in the Progressive Magazine in April, fishers report that things are getting much worse, with production of some crops reportedly down by as much as 80% in the hardest hit areas. The outlook is grim for recovery in the near term and many experts worry that some species may never fully recover. In Prince William Sound Alaska, for example, herring fisheries all but disappeared in the wake of the Valdez spill.

The Congressional Research Service reports that in 2008, the Gulf commercial fishing industry supported over 213,000 jobs with related income impacts of $5.5 billion. Additionally, recreational fisheries supported numerous businesses and spent over $12.5 billion on durable equipment and trips in the Gulf. Combined, Gulf seafood and recreational fishing industry = $18 billion a year business.

I conservatively estimate that just one third of the industry will be out for just five years = $30 billion.

Tourism = $9.7 billion
According to Oxford Economics, visitors to Congressional Districts along the Gulf coast spent in excess of $34 billion in 2008, sustaining 400,000 jobs. In an extensive analysis of past disasters affecting tourism destinations, including oil spills, the group estimated in July 2010 (after the well was caped) the possible costs to tourism at $22.7 billion over three years. It estimates a cost reduction of $7.5 billion if BP spent $500 million on tourism marketing. BP has spent $179 million on such advertising. The report, however, overestimates the tourist areas of Florida impacted by the spill.

Taking these elements into account yields a final estimate of $9.7 billion over three years.

Economic Loss – Human Health: $20 billion ($10 x 2 [AFA])

More than 21 million people live along the U.S. Gulf Coast. As I reported in The Nation in May, in the wake of the disaster, acute health problems have been widely reported across the Gulf and doctors and researchers predict a host of chronic ailments. The most common acute problems are headaches; nausea; respiratory problems, irritated eyes, nose, throat, and lungs; and asthma attacks. Others report a “BP rash” of itchy, peeling, irritated and even burned skin and neurological effects, dubbed “BP moments,” include dizziness, forgetfulness, and confusion. Extreme health impacts including excessive bleeding from nose, ears, breasts, urinary tract, and anal canal; heart irregularities; and dementia are also reported. Expected chronic impacts include, respiratory ailments, developmental disorders for fetuses and children, neurological disorders, cancers, liver and kidney disease, and mental health disorders.

The proposed Medical Benefits Settlement with BP severely underestimates the potential impacted population and includes just an estimated 200,000 people. It does not, however, include a financial cap.

I estimate the health costs, which are expected to last for decades, at just one quarter the broader financial toll: $10 billion.

The Gulf oil spill is the largest ecological disaster in U.S. history and the world’s largest offshore oil spill. The failures that led to this disaster are not only endemic of BP, Transocean, Halliburton, and their other Macondo partners, but they permeate the entire offshore oil industry, which has pushed beyond its own technological capacity in pursuit of profit. Fortunately, we have laws that not only punish these actions, provide for restoration and restitution, but are also designed to deter such risky and destructive activities in the future. If BP is not held to the law, than the costs of such dangerous operations will invariably be once again outweighed by the benefits.

Antonia Juhasz is a leading oil and energy analyst who has written extensively on the BP Gulf oil spill. She is the author of several books, including Black Tide: the Devastating Impact of the Gulf Oil Spill (Wiley, 2011). With support from The Investigative Fund of the Nation Institute, she wrote the cover article of The Nation in May, “Investigation: Two Years After the BP Spill, A Hidden Health Crisis Festers.” She also wrote the cover article of the Progressive Magazine in April, “BP Oil Still Tars the Gulf.” She spent much of 2010 embedded within those communities most impacted by the spill.

With research by Lindsey Ingraham and Amit Srivastava.

 

Russian Mafia: Who is the Executive Director Of TNK-BP

 

Surname: Khan

Name: Herman

Fathername: Borisovich

Position: Executive director of TNK-BP

The Biography:

Born in 1961 in Kiev, in a family of leading scientist-metallurgist. He finished school in 1978. After the school he worked as fitter’s apprentice at the Kiev experimental factory of non-standard equipment; became a fitter of the 2nd category; took great interest in boxing. In 1979 he enrolled in the Industrial-Pedagogical College, graduated in 1982 with honors. He entered the Moscow Institute of Steel and Alloys (MISA), the Faculty of ferrous metals casting. That was the place he got acquainted with Mikhail Fridman and Alexei Kuzmichev – future partners in the Alfa Group.

In 1988, Khan began to work in cooperative “Cosmos”, rented space in TsUM (unified shopping center) and got engaged in wholesale of garments, footwear and jewelry. Alexander Furman became his first business partner. In 1989, Khan and Furman created their own cooperative “Alexandrina”, in which Furman was engaged in tailoring, and Herman Khan – in supplying works and sales and formally taking up the post of deputy chairman of the cooperative. In March 1989, Herman Khan and Friedman united their businesses. The latter had had the JV “Alfa-Ecoby” business by that moment. In 1990-1992 Herman Khan was the head of the wholesale trade, then the head of the export department of the company “Alfa-Eco”- that was engaged in selling carpets from the Caucasus and Central Asia, perfumes, Czech lamps, agricultural products, sugar under the Cuban contract, liquors, and tea.

In 1992 Herman Khan took over the oil program “Alpha”. In 1995, he headed the raw materials department of “Alpha-Eco”. Later “Alpha” had got a number of projects with Achinsk Alumina Refinery and Zapsib. They traded a bit on the coal market; started delivering oil to Ukhta refinery in the Komi Republic and to Lisichanskiy refinery in Ukraine.

In 1996 Herman Khan obtained the post of president of the company “Alpha-Eco”. The Company began to export oil. The first customer was the company “Galaxy” owned by Leonid Minin, a well known person in the criminal circles in Ukraine. Since early 1998 Herman Khan had become the deputy chairman and the first vice-president of the “Tyumen Oil” Company.

Currently Herman Khan obtains the post of Executive Director of TNK-BP and supervises all operational activities of the company, except for the gas sector; he is a shareholder of TNK-BP and Alfa-Bank and also a board member of the management company “TNK-BP Management”; member of the Board of Directors of “Alfa-Bank” and “Slavneft” and member of the Russian Presidium of the Jewish Congress.

Herman Khan lives in the settlement Razdory of the Odintsovo district, Moscow region; has a gun registration (pistol IZH-71 “) as a security guard of Ltd.”PSA “Alfa-Garant”.

Khan is married to a stewardess of “Transaero”company, brings up two daughters: 1995 and 2001 year of birth
RB.RU RUSSIAN BUSINESS http://www.rb.ru/biz/people/show/10077/
The Dossier:

The first scandal with the name of Herman Khan appeared in the press in April 1995. Members of the Headquarters of Combating Organized Crime of the RF Interior Ministry raided the “Alfa-Eco”offices to detect drugs and discreditable documents. The search was provoked by the fact that in late March – early April 1995 a group poisoning of Khabarovsk residents with sugar had happened. During the investigation it came out that a high dose of drugs contained in sugar had caused the poisoning. It was found out that the containers with sugar had been previously rented by “Alfa-Eco” and used for transportation of consignment to the company «Harmaty and Co» , while Han was one of its founders.
http://lpl.org.ua/biography-13.aspx, newspaper “Version”, 06.06.1999

The press released information that the secret drug-related operations were carried out by the company “Alfa-Eco”, headed by Herman Khan. He was also a founder of a number of firms, including the Hungarian «Harmaty and Co» (jointly with «Harmaty ech Tarrna») and the Czech «Alfa-Eco» (jointly with «Altex Ltd»). According to the constituent documents, both of those firms were engaged in export and sales of carpet products to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. However according to sources in the law enforcement bodies, their statutory activities served as a cover. In fact, «Harmaty and Co» and «Alfa-Eco» were involved in international drug trafficking and narcotic dollars laundering through some of the employees. In particular the companies were the chain links on which the transit of drugs from the South East Asia to Europe had been carried out.
http://www.peoples.ru

In July 10 2003 the Moscow Arbitration Court (Case number A40-49954/02-21-494) acknowledged that the information did not correspond to reality and discredited the honor and business reputation of the Open Company “Alfa-Eco”.

In 1999, as a member of the board of directors of the oil company “Sidanco”, Herman Khan undertook attempts to establish the “Alfa-eko” companies’ control over the enterprises of “Sidanco” which were located in the Saratov and Irkutsk regions. To have an impact on managers and shareholders of “Saratovneftegaz” and “Saratovnefteprodukt” Khan involved criminal structures. They helped to wreck the shareholders’ meetings in both companies twice, local RUOP also assisted to Herman Khan in that case. Moreover Khan pressed in person the business leaders and even the governor of the Saratov region, Dmitry Ayatskov.
Newspaper “Version”, 06.06.1999

In early 2000 they said Herman Khan had a relation to Lieutenant of the General Ministry of Internal Affairs Alexander Orlov, a former assistant and second-hand of the Interior Minister, Vladimir Rushailo. Orlov carried out especially delicate orders of the ministerial command. There was a considerable quantity of materials in special services on Alexander Orlov’s contacts with the prominent businessmen. Herman Khan acted as one of Orlov’s friends and sponsors. Thank to Orlov the structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs took the side of the businessman and other oligarchs in conflicts with their creditors and debtors: upon the request of one side they beat the debts out of the others. The cost of this was about 50 percent of the amount of the debt.
“Novaya Gazeta” 28.05.2001

In the middle of 2001 Herman Khan was accused of gathering compromising material on the former Natural Resources Minister, Vitaly Artyukhov. At that time the Artjuhov’s file appeared in the editor’s office of “Novaya Gazeta”. It included information on legislation infringements by Artyukhov and in particular denounced Artyukhov of aiding and abetting to plunder of budgetary funds while being the Minister of Natural Resources. The possible reason of Khan’s interest to Artyukhov might have lain in the position of the head of the Ministry of Natural Resources. He could be a figure in a chain of many moves allowing the oligarchs, including Khan, to have an insider in public office, who would be obliged to protect the commercial interests of a certain circle of people.
“Novaya Gazeta”, 30.07.2001

The scandal around the name of Herman Khan took place in December 2002. That time «Alfa Group” formed an alliance with “Sibneft”, and as a result they won an auction sale of the state shares of “Slavneft”. This tactic deprived the government of an additional income that could be obtained through the more competitive auction. “Alfa-group” had been often criticized for its aggressiveness. At that time they started calling Herman Khan the most ruthless businessman of the country.
«The Financial Times», 29.08.2003

In 2003, the State Duma deputy Vladimir Yudin appealed to the General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Ustinov with inquiry concerning the activity of the “TNK-BP” management. Yudin pointed out that the District Court of New York was preceding the trial against the heads and owners of the company OAO “Tyumen Oil Company” (TNK). In the inquiry the deputy also pointed to the names of Herman Khan, Joseph Bakaleinik, Viktor Vekselberg, Semyon Kukes and Leonard Blavatnik. According to Yudin, the above-stated persons had flagrantly infringed Russian laws on mineral resources, bankruptcy, joint-stock companies, etc. in order to expand their oil business. While doing this they descended on the direct pressure on managers, court and law enforcement agencies. With reference to the documents received from Canada, in particular from the company Norex »(Norex), Yudin claimed that the U.S. court accused the above persons of the criminal cases, such as racketeering (extortion), threatening of physical violence to the heads of ZAO Yugraneft”, OJSC ” Chernogorneft “and” Norex “.
Interfax, 02.12.2003.

At the bottom of the conflict between Norex and TNK was the JSC “Corporation” Yugraneft “, created in 1992 by the Canadian company (60%) and” Chernogorneft (40%) for the small deposits development. In 2000, the bankrupted “Chernogorneft” went to “TNK”, and in summer 2001 the TNK management appointed its own general director of “Yugraneft”. The Khanty-Mansiysk Arbitration Court invalidated the Norex’s contribution to the charter capital of “Yugraneft”, and the share of “TNK” got increased up to 80%. Norex was unable to defend their interests in the Russian courts, and in 2002 filed the lawsuit in New York.
The newspaper “Vedomosti”, 03.12.2003

Press had also exaggerated the visit of Herman Khan to Ukraine in April 2005 in order to decide an issue of introduction of limited selling prices for fuel. Shortly before the visit of Khan to the government of Ukraine, agency “Interfax-Ukraine” had circulated information that the Prosecutor General of Ukraine sent a complaint to the State Property Fund and “TNK-Ukraine” on the illegal privatization of the Lisichansk refinery, owned by TNK-BP. This information allowed the Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to make Herman Khan agree on selling gasoline at filling stations on the prices set by the Ministry of Economy. Immediately after the meeting with Khan, the Prime Minister said that TNK-BP was going to lower prices for gasoline at the filling stations to the level established by the Government.
http://www.newsru.com, 22.04.2005

Herman Khan appeared to be in the conflict epicenter in September 2005, when lawyers, attracted by the International Union of veterans of the armed forces and law enforcement officials had indicated that the “Alfa Group”, co-owned by Herman Khan, had been doing the oil business with law infringements. Herman Khan, Mikhail Fridman, Alexei Kuzmicheva, Leonard Blavatnik and Viktor Vekselberg were accused of fraudulent embezzlement of 40%-stake of TNK, of usage of transfer pricing, tax evasion and fraudulent establishing control over the “Nizhnevartovskneftegaz” and artificial bankruptcy of “Chernogorneft .

At the same time, deputy Nikolai Pavlov complained to the General Prosecutor that representatives of Alfa Telecom offered him a compensation in case he testified at the trial of “MegaFon” (it was a long-lasting lawsuit of “Alfa Telecom” and Bermuda fund IPOC for 25.1% shares of cellular operator “MegaFon”). They assumed that the owner of IPOC, Jeffrey Galmond helped the Union of Veterans of the armed forces “to expose” the Herman Khan’s company.
The newspaper “Vedomosti” 26.09.2005

In spring 2008, the shareholders of TNK-BP came into a conflict because of the consortium AAR (Alfa Group by Mikhail Fridman, Access by Leonard Blavatnik and Renova by Viktor Vekselberg’s) which was representing the interests of the Russian shareholders demanded the resignation of the operating director of TNK-BP, Robert Dudley. They asserted he had been managing the company in interests of the British. One of the main accusations against Robert Dudley was the fact that he exceeded the amount of capital investment over the agreed limit of 3.5 billion pounds up to 900 million pounds. In their turn, the British experts of BP argued that according to the analysis results of TNK-BP and BP reports and data of Forbes magazine about the states of the richest people in the world, Herman Khan had received 2.1 billion dollars of dividends, as well as 1.7 billion dollars on the growth of shares rate of TNK-BP Holding. In early September, the shareholders of TNK-BP agreed that Robert Dudley was going to leave the post of the operating director; the new one would be nominated by BP and approved by the Board of Directors of the company. Insiders of TNK-BP reported on their fears that Russian main shareholder, Herman Khan could use the interim period to take the company under his control and use the financial crisis to restructure the company at his own discretion. In November 2008 TNK-BP announced the reduction of workplaces on 15% due to the rapid decline of oil prices. Some former heads of BP argued that Khan used the reduction as an excuse to oust the former BP representatives from the company.
http://www.newsru.com, 01.12.2008

In January 9, 2009 the owners of TNK-BP signed an amended agreement on joint management of the company. The election of a new independent president of the company and inclusion of three independent members to the board of directors caused conflict of the shareholders around the TNK-BP.
http://www.newsru.com, 11.01.2009 g.

At the same time, the British media reported on the prosecution, which could have led to freezing of the accounts of Herman Khan in the western banks. The conflict occurred because of confrontation between BP, on the one hand, and the Russian partners in TNK-BP, as well as the Russian authorities, on the other hand (the American Robert Dudley who had been appointed by BP to the post of chief executive officer of TNK-BP, left Moscow and went into hiding in Europe). At that time the representatives of BP sought for legal advice in order to initiate proceedings in the commercial court of Sweden against the Russian shareholder consortium AAR (Alfa Group by Mikhail Fridman, Access by Leonard Blavatnik and Renova by Viktor Vekselberg). They charged the shareholders with infringements of corporate domestic law.
Kompromat.ru, 28.07.2008

The conflict occurred in the TNK-BP during the TNK-BP shareholders negotiation with the former general director of Norilsk Nickel, Denis Morozov. Morozov was proposed to take a post of CEO of TNK-BP. According to one of the versions, the shareholders promised that the new director would be able to form his own management team. However in January 2009 they announced that managers-shareholders and operating directors -Viktor Vekselberg and Herman Khan – were going to stay in the new rule. Morozov in his turn insisted on clear delineation of his responsibilities and the powers of the shareholders. Khan and Vekselberg disagreed with Morozov and began to search for the new candidates.
http://www.newsru.com 21.01.2009 g.

At the same time, the British shareholders supported the candidature of Denis Morozov and demanded the resignation of Herman Khan. Otherwise the Denis Morozov’s authority in the company would be significantly limited.
http://www.newsru.com, 19.01.2009 g.

The decision was taken in November 2009 – Board of Directors of TNK-BP unanimously supported the decision to appoint Maxim Barski to the post of the Chief Executive Officer starting from 1 January 2011. Till that time Mikhail Fridman, an executive chairman of the Board of Directors of TNK-BP had been acting as temporary chief operating director.

Lately they have been connecting Herman Khan with the Deputy Prime Minister, Igor Sechin. In the next month or two, an administrative attack on the Agriculture Minister Elena Skrynnik (protege of vice-premier Viktor Zubkov) might be organized by the concerned group of officials. With support of Sechin they try to promote the co-owner of “Rostselmash”, Konstantin Babkin to that place. “Rosagroleasing” is also expected to get changed as they plan to convert it into a state corporation. In this connection a staffing struggle of Sechin against Viktor Zubkov may be initiated in order to relocate AIC. To strengthen his position, Sechin picks up a strong team and Herman Khan is a part of it.
http://www.newsru.com, 10.02.2010 r

 

The Gulf Oil Disaster: 1 image equals 1000 Words

Hey hi ) I dont agree 100% with Alex Jones,Infowars or /and Jesse Ventura but I have to admit they both hit a nerve. Something wasn’t adding up in both disasters.Something wasn’t right. And I say that as an ex Oil Engineer/Researcher.Something wasn’t right from the beginning. My apologies it took me so long to end up on this one.concentrating all theories which.. BTW.. they are not conspiracies.. Those are your only reality.. Scroll back at my older Oil posts.. something is Greasy,many interests not even in conflict but working together.

Even the Anaheim event was staged. I mean Jesus..

9 Mysterious Deaths For BP

The Intel Hub
October 27, 2011

In the last year and a half at least 10 experts, whistleblowers and BP connected individuals have died under mysterious circumstances.

This information was widely reported in an April 10th, 2011 video which at the time listed 9 deaths and 3 imprisonments, disappearances, or attempted assassinations.

Now, another BP oil spill connected individual has mysteriously died, moving the number of oil spill connected deaths to at least 10.

George Thomas Wainwright, a BP ROV pilot was supposedly killed in a freak shark attack in Australia.

The avid outdoorsman and Texas A&M graduate was a marine systems engineer involved with capping the Macondo well after last year’s BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.

Wainwright – whose body was recovered by the college friends he was boating with – is the third man killed by a great white in the state in two months.

While this is obviously a very sad story, it may have a more sinister meaning considering the fact that at least 9 other BP and oil spill related whistleblowers or experts have died since the oil spill that saw a horrendous amount of openly toxic dispersant sprayed throughout the gulf.

Consider this breakdown from Real Coastal Warriors:

Tucker Mendoza

April 2, 2011 – Tucker Mendoza, gulf truth activist, still recovering, along with his niece. Shot four times through his front door, niece hit twice. Anyone with information regarding this shooting incident should call St. John the Baptist Parish Detectives at 985-359-8769 or Crimestoppers at 504-822-1111.

 

 

 

 

 

Gregory Stone

February 17, 2011 – LSU scientist Gregory Stone, 54 – Died of Unknown Illness. Stone was an oft-quoted

expert concerning the damage the leaked oil might cause to the coast.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Anthony Nicholas Tremonte

January 26, 2011 – Anthony Nicholas Tremonte, age 31 – Mississippi Department of Marine Resources officer, from Ocean Springs arrested on child porn charge

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dr. Thomas B. Manton

January 19, 2011 – Dr. Thomas B. Manton, former President and CEO of the International Oil Spill Control Corporation – imprisonment and subsequent murder while jailed.

 

 

 

 

John P. Wheeler III

December 31, 2010 – John P. Wheeler III, a former Pentagon official and presidential aide and a defense consultant and expert on chemical and biological weapons – was beaten to death in an assault, body was discovered in a Wilmington landfill.

 

 

 

 

James Patrick Black

November 23, 2010 – James Patrick Black, an incident commander for BP’s Gulf of Mexico oil spill response team, died Tuesday night near Destin, Florida in a small plane crash

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chitra Chaunhan

November 15, 2010 – Chitra Chaunhan, age 33, worked in the USF Center for Biological Defense and Global Health Infectious Disease Research – Found dead in an apparent suicide by cyanide at a Temple Terrace hotel. She leaves behind a husband and a young child.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dr. Geoffrey Gardner

November, 2010 – MIA Status – Dr. Geoffrey Gardner of Lakeland, FL – Swan expert who “ran into legal trouble over an expired prescription license has closed his practice” — Was investigating unexplained bird deaths near Sarasota abruptly and immediately closed his practice, and apparently his investigation into the deaths of swans in Sarasota, suspected to have been impacted by the BP Oil Disaster. No one has heard or spoken with him since. Watch this news report covering his investigation before his disappearance: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sqbx2TnbYlc&feature=player_embedded

 

 

 

Roger Grooters

October 6, 2010 – Roger Grooters, age 66, was hit by a truck as he passed through Panama City, Florida. Mr. Grooters had been knocked down and killed close to the end of a 3,200-mile trans-America charity ride to raise awareness about the Gulf Coast oil disaster. He began his cross-country bike ride in Oceanside, California, on September 10th. Grooters’s family and friends will cycle the final stretch of the journey from the Pacific to the Atlantic in his honour, raising cash to support Gulf Coast families.

 

 

 

 

 

Senator Ted Stevens

August 9, 2010 – Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, 86, the longest-serving Republican senator in history, was among nine people on board when the 1957 DeHavilland DHC-3 Otter, crashed into a brush- and rock-covered mountainside Monday afternoon about 17 miles north of the southwest Alaska fishing town of Dillingham, federal officials said. Stevens was the recipient of a whistleblower’s communication relative to the BP Oil Disaster blow-out preventer, and a conspiracy of secrecy to hide the facts from the public.

“You and your fellow Committee members may wish to require BP to explain what action was ultimately instituted to cease the practice of falsifying BOP tests at BP Prudhoe drilling rigs. It was a cost saving but dangerous practice, again endangering the BP workforce, until I exposed it to Senator Ted Stevens, the EPA, and the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission.” The cause of the crash is still an OPEN investigation by the NTSB (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=ANC10MA068&rpt=p)

 

 

 

 

 

Matthew Simmons

August 13, 2010 – Matthew Simmons, age 67 – Simmons’ body was found Sunday night in his hot tub, investigators said. An autopsy by the state medical examiner’s office concluded Monday that he died from accidental drowning with heart disease as a contributing factor – “It was painful as can be” to be only insider willing to speak out against the “officials” during the BP Oil Disaster in the Gulf of Mexico.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Scientist Joseph Morrissey

April 6, 2010 – Scientist

Scientist Joseph Morrissey, age 46 – cell biologist and college professor, a near-native Floridian who chose to return to South Florida after studying at elite universities – was fatally shot during what police say was a home invasion robbery.

 

 

 

 

 

 

And now, after the untimely death of George Thomas Wainwright we can add another to this eerie list: (First part of deaths lists courtesy of Real Coastal Warriors.)

Marine Systems Engineer George Thomas Wainwright

October 22nd/23rd 2011 – BP ROV pilot George Wainwright was killed in apparent freak shark attack off the cost of Australia where some believe he was hiding out in fear of his life.(unconfirmed)

These mysterious deaths absolutely must be investigated but without widespread media coverage they will most likely remain largely unknown. The sad fact is most journalists may actually fear reprisal if they even bring up these deaths.Source

SURGUTNEFTGAS AND BP’S Bob Dudley

 

Source
In the short run, possibly for three quarters of this year, BP, run by chief executive Bob Dudley, will be short of its half-billion dollar quarterly cash dividend from TNK-BP. In the long run, whether Mikhail Fridman and his partners sell their 50% stake in TNK-BP to BP or to another Russian oil company, BP is on the skids, either out of Russia entirely, or remaining on terms that will give a Russian stakeholder new power over BP’s main shareholding – potentially the single largest stake in BP.

This is definitely not the understanding you would form if you read the Anglo-American press. The spoon-fed correspondent at the Financial Times quoted “one person close to the company” (BP) as claiming that the Russians had been “wrongfooted by BP’s decision to pursue a sale.” The Telegraph reports Dudley’s tactic is to “smoke out the troublesome oligarchs who are proving impossible to work with – to make them cooperate or sell their stake to a more compliant bedfellow.” The Wall Street Journal thinks Dudley is playing the card game of Mississippi Stud, in which “players have three opportunities to raise the stakes, or fold and walk away… Upping the ante a third time might be a winning strategy in poker. But in Russia they favor a different, and much more dangerous game of chance.”

Just how much cash Dudley will be unable to count on BP’s balance sheet for the time being is calculated here. BP cannot be expected to play much of a poker game if the stack of its chips on the table is already too small to wager.

On another card-playing point, the Anglo-American and Russian sources all agree – BP doesn’t have a government on its side of table: not the US, with which is at war with BP over the bill for the Gulf of Mexico oil spill; nor the UK, which is preoccupied with saving itself from its domestic enemies and for diversion is at war with the Euro zone and Bashar al-Assad.

So now that the game has been opened, what are the cards, and what are the rules of this game?

If the unsolicited expression of interest to buy BP’s stake in TNK-BP, which Dudley has announced, didn’t originate from Fridman and the Alfa Access Renova (AAR) partners, there is no evidence that it was from Rosneft, or Gazprom, or Igor Sechin, the controlling policymaker for the Russian energy sector. Rosneft could not have made the move without Sechin’s say-so, and Sechin says he didn’t initiate the move. Alexei Miller is categorical that his group, including Gazpromneft, didn’t make the move. If Dudley is telling the truth, he should beware of making Sechin appear to be a liar. And not for the first time. Sechin may have been angry at the way in which his plan for the Rosneft-BP alliance was destroyed in 2011, but he was not less furious at Dudley than at Fridman for the outcome. Indeed, Sechin ended up angrier at Dudley and does not consider him a reliable counterparty at the negotiating table. The latter ought to have heard about that by now, even if BP shareholders have not.

Supposing that a half-share in TNK-BP, either Fridman’s or Dudley’s, should be valued at up to $35 billion (counting the ancillary assets and a control premium), Rosneft doesn’t have the ready cash, the management strategy, or the will to borrow to be the buyer. Remember that the most Rosneft was prepared to offer BP in their ill-fated alliance on January 14, last year, was a swap of 9.5% of Rosneft shares for 5% of BP shares. At the time, the Rosneft stake was worth $7.8 billion, the BP stake £4.5 billion ($7.1 billion), and the combined value about $15 billion. Here’s BP’s calculation at deal announcement.

No deal can be done of any kind on the territory of Russia or with Russian assets between BP and a third party without compliance with the terms of BP’s joint venture and shareholder agreement with AAR, which commenced in 2003 at the formation of TNK-BP. The terms of that agreement have not been published. AAR’s claims that BP has violated the terms have been part of several threats of litigation, as well as pending lawsuits and arbitrations. The terms were upheld in the Stockholm Arbitration Tribunal ruling of April 8, 2011, which effectively killed Dudley’s deal with Sechin. Read again what Sechin had to say at the time. What he is saying now is that the terms of that agreement need to be opened by the Russian anti-trust watchdog, the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS), for a determination of whether the contract is in compliance or in violation of Russian law. That’s a strong hint that the terms on which AAR have relied may be nullified. But such an outcome would increase the flexibility on the Russian side, not only on BP’s side. Any number of combinations or permutations of the two stakes in TNK-BP would become possible – without Fridman and his AAR comrades being in a position to veto them. Of course, if the FAS decides the AAR terms are enforceable under Russian law, that would mean Sechin has decided against BP once more, and Dudley has no flexibility left. If the FAS decides that it cannot rule until and unless the Russian parliament amends the applicable statutes, that would be tantamount to defeat for Dudley. BP would face more months of no cash dividend from TNK-BP.

The only Russian buyer with enough cash to buy into TNK-BP from either side is not Rosneft but Surgutneftegaz (SNG). According to Renaissance Capital’s report on SNG’s financial position, as of December 31 last, its net cash amounted to $26.7 billion. Its market capitalization is almost $40 billion. With negligible debts, its borrowing capacity, especially from Russia’s state banks, is large. If SNG is to be the buy-out vehicle, there remains the unanswered question – who and what will the target be? Imagine if SNG bought out Fridman and his partners for cash, and swapped BP’s stake in a share-swap scheme similar to the one attempted in 2011 by Sechin with Rosneft, with additional cash to equalize for the value differential between Rosneft then and SNG post-deal. That would eliminate both sources of trouble at TNK-BP, and eventually bring it within Sechin’s direct control in a follow-on merger between SNG and Rosneft. Whatever the outcome, and taking into account that too few decisions have been taken to date to make forecasting reliable, the one certainty is that if BP doesn’t exit Russia altogether, its largest single stakeholder is bound to be Russian. In a British doughnut, that’s quite a hole.

 

When Life Gives You OIL Dispersants Toxicity …

Oil is known to be toxic to living organisms of all types. However, oil dispersants used to treat and control oil spills also can be harmful and lethal.

Oil dispersants are useful when oil spills occur and these dispersants are helpful in the control and management of oil spills in saline or fresh waters. Oil dispersants permit oil spills to be processed and degraded more rapidly by creating oil-dispersant-water interfaces. Oil dispersants remove oil from the water surface and cause it to sink into the water column. Also, subsurface oil masses subjected to underwater dispersants are prevented from rising to the surface. Both surface and subsurface oil dispersants contribute to the formation of distinct underwater oil plumes.
Oil Dispersant Chemical Composition of COREXIT

Listed below are the EPA-listed components (epa.gov) contained in the two major COREXIT products used by BP for the Gulf of Mexico oil spill.

COREXIT Oil Dispersant – Biochemical Composition

1,2-Propanediol (CAS: 57-55-6)
Ethanol, 2-butoxy-* (CAS: 111-76-2)
Butanedioic acid, 2-sulfo-, 1,4-bis(2-ethylhexyl) ester, sodium salt (1:1) (CAS: 577-11-7)
Sorbitan, mono-(9Z)-9-octadecenoate (UCAS: 1338-43-8)
Sorbitan, mono-(9Z)-9-octadecenoate, poly(oxy-1,2-ethanediyl) derivs. (CAS: 9005-65-6)
Sorbitan, tri-(9Z)-9-octadecenoate, poly(oxy-1,2-ethanediyl) derivs. (CAS: 9005-70-3 )
Propanol, 1-(2-butoxy-1-methylethoxy)- (CAS: 29911-28-2 2)
Distillates (petroleum), hydrotreated light (CAS: 64742-47-8 )

(*Note: Ethanol, 2-butoxy- is not contained in Corexit 9500 and the CAS numbers provided above are registry numbers of the American Chemical Society)

Hydrogen Sulfide Problem? Reduce H2S in oils and fuels Sulfix™ H2S scavengers http://www.bakerhughes.com/sulfix
Oil Spill Detection Using Coastal or Port radar system Automatic Real Time Oil Spill Alert http://www.VissimVts.com

In summary, the major components of COREXIT are essentially butanedioic acid, butoxyethanol, propanediol, propanol, sorbitan (octadecenoate compounds and derivatives) and some light petroleum distillates. Depending on the concentration, each of these products alone has some toxic or lethal characteristics.
Oil Dispersant Toxicity Lab Tests

The EPA has established specific laboratory procedures to evaluate the toxicity of the 18 different dispersants currently approved for use to treat oil spills. These lab tests involve the following major aspects:

test organisms (one specific species of fish and one specific species of crustacean)
serial diluted concentrations of dispersant or oil to yield known parts per million (ppm)
introduction of test organisms and timed exposure for 48 and 96 hours
observation and recording of live and dead test organisms after the 48- and 96-hr exposure and comparison with controls not exposed to either dispersant or dispersant-oil combination

Oil Dispersant Lab Methods and Results

The healthy fish and the crustaceans are counted and added in defined numbers to the test and control containers. Control containers contain neither the dispersant nor the oil and controls serve to determine if anything abnormal is happening in the test system. Typically, all control animals survive in the control containers. Experimental test containers harbor the diluted dispersant or dispersant-oil materials at the different, measured concentrations in ppm.

Cited here below are actual lab results in parts per million for dispersant alone and dispersant mixed with fuel oil. Notice that the dispersant alone requires higher ppm to cause death than the combination of fuel oil and dispersant. This shows that this combination is more dangerous than dispersant alone. No results are given for fuel oil alone. This control is omitted for these tests:

COREXIT® EC9500A was tested on the fish Menidia beryllina and the crustacean Mysidopsis bahia and the LC50 (ppm) was 25.20 at 96-hr and 32.23 48-hr respectively for each species.
COREXIT® EC9500A and No. 2 Fuel Oil (1:10) mixed tested similarly with Menidia beryllina and the crustacean Mysidopsis bahia yielded an LC50 of 2.61 at 96-hr and 3.40 at 48-hr.

(Data above is adapted from epa.gov. Accessed June 11, 2010.)
Oil Dispersants and Animal and Human Toxicity

Oil, dispersants and oil-dispersant mixtures are known to have toxicity for marine animals in their natural environments (response.restoration.noaa.gov. Accessed June 11, 2010) However, the overall and detailed long-term effects of these chemicals and mixtures on marine animals is not documented.

People using oil dispersants are advised to use:

a half face filter mask or an air-supplied breathing apparatus (protects respiratory tissues of the nose, throat, bronchi and lungs)
nitrile or PVC gloves, coveralls, boots for skin protection
chemical splash goggles for eye safety

Product warnings from the manufacturer clearly indicate the possible dangers of contact with concentrated or diluted dispersants. Therefore, skin, respiratory and ocular damage is possible when exposed to oil dispersants.

In summary, dispersants alone, or when combined and interacting with oil, pose hazards to animals and humans. Long term studies on the effects of these chemicals on individuals and populations is lacking and it may be hypothesized that internal tissue damage to essential organs such as liver, kidneys and intestines of animals and humans may well occur. The EPA is expected to make some of these determinations following the current BP Gulf spill.

Read more at Suite101: Oil Dispersant Toxic Effects on Animals and Humans | Suite101.com http://suite101.com/article/oil-dispersant-toxic-effects-on-plants-animals-and-humans-a247831#ixzz21W7VqTJE

G4S: Finance & Investors wow that's interesting!

Finances

Read any newspaper article about G4S and you are more than likely to be told the company is the biggest employer on the London Stock Exchange, with over 650,000 staff and “operations” in more 125 countries. These facts are written big throughout its annual report, suggesting, as they do, size and success. However, the company’s accounts show its finances are not as impressive as its favourite stats may suggest.[1]

2011 saw the company post £198 million in profit, from a turnover of £7.5 billion. This was £50 million lower than the previous year’s profits but would have been higher were it not for the £55 million incurred in the failed takeover of ISS.

The company’s balance sheet, though hardly precarious, does not inspire the same confidence. G4S has total assets of £5.6 billion against liabilities of £4.1 billion, leaving it with equity of £1.5 billion (assets – liabilities = equity). Look closer at the assets column and you’ll see that £2.2 billion of these liabilities are accounted for as ‘goodwill’.

Goodwill is the value of a company over and above its tangible assets (although, confusingly, software is often counted as goodwill). A potentially profitable start-up company with a great idea for vacuum cleaners, for example, would not be bought for the value of the chairs and desks in its office, but the perceived value of the money that company’s vacuums can make in the future.

G4S’ accounts show the excess of goodwill on its balance sheet came from its previous incarnation as Group 4 Falck’s acquisition of Securicor in 2011. It paid more for the company than its ‘book value’ as it had intangible qualities that were deemed worth paying more than the tangible value on the balance sheet.

Chief among G4S’ qualities is its perceived knowledge of how to run services. This will provoke hollow laughter from anybody who has suffered from the company’s cost-cutting, often brutal, approach to service provision, but it’s not in doubt that the company has governments convinced. Still, £2.2 billion remains a huge amount of goodwill. If the company loses half of its goodwill, for example, its equity would be reduced to £400 million. Much more and the accountants would start getting itchy.

G4S is also carrying a significant level of debt. Its accounts show it owes around £900 million in loans to banks, and almost £1.2 billion due through loan notes issued since 2007 to unknown investors. £830 million of these notes are private, £350 million are publicly traded (known as Eurobonds). G4S has recently added to this debt by issuing a £489 million Eurobond in March 2012.[2]

The interest on the bank loans amounted to around £200 million in 2011, with the average cost of borrowing almost 5%. This is not excessive in corporate terms – it has a BBB credit rating at the time of writing – but is significantly more than the public sector would pay for financing.

Investors

Major investors as of February 2012:

PRUDENTIAL PLC 6.33%
BLACKROCK, INC 4.96%
HARRIS ASSOCIATES LP 4.93%
LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC 3.97%
FRANKLIN RESOURCES, INC. via its funds 3.41%
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP PLC via its funds 3.06%
INVESCO LTD. via its funds 2.30%
LONGVIEW PARTNERS LIMITED via its funds 2.06%
AEGON NV via its funds 1.87%
GOVERNMENT OF NORWAY via its funds 1.64%
STATE STREET CORPORATION via its funds 1.45%
MARATHON ASSET MANAGEMENT via its funds 1.30%
UBS AG via its funds 1.28%
AFFILIATED MANAGERS GROUP INC via its funds 1.11%
NCH PUMPKIN LIMITED via its funds 1.11%
PUBLIC INSTITUTION FOR SOCIAL SECURITY via its funds 1.02%
VANGUARD GROUP, INC. via its funds 0.95%
HSBC HOLDINGS PLC via its funds 0.87%
SAS RUE LA BOETIE via its funds 0.84%
INVESTEC PLC via its funds 0.79%
N MAS UNO IBG SA via its funds 0.76%
TRILOGY GLOBAL ADVISORS, LLC via its funds 0.76%
SKY INVESTMENT COUNSEL INC via its funds 0.73%
MARATHON ASSET MANAGEMENT, L.P. via its funds 0.67%
ALLIANZ SE via its funds 0.65%
SCHRODERS PLC via its funds 0.65%
CAZENOVE CAPITAL HOLDINGS LTD. via its funds 0.64%
AVIVA PLC via its funds 0.61%
HENDERSON GROUP PLC via its funds 0.60%
CANTILLON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC via its funds 0.58%
DEUTSCHE BANK AG via its funds 0.57%
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY via its funds 0.57%
BARCLAYS PLC via its funds 0.53%
F&C ASSET MANAGEMENT PLC via its funds 0.51%
NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION via its funds 0.49%
STICHTING PENSIOENFONDS ABP via its funds 0.49%
ABERDEEN ASSET MANAGEMENT PLC via its funds 0.46%
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. via its funds 0.43%
ROYAL LONDON MUTUAL INSURANCE SOCIETY LTD via its funds 0.39%
SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN via its funds 0.39%
G4S EMPLOYEE BENEFIT TRUST 0.38%
UNIVERSITIES SUPERANNUATION SCHEME LIMITED via its funds 0.38%
STANDARD LIFE PLC via its funds 0.37%
BP P.L.C. via its funds 0.35%
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG via its funds 0.35%
GOVERNMENT OF SINGAPORE via its funds 0.35%
COVEA via its funds 0.30%
NFU MUTUAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATION LIMITED via its funds 0.29%
SPAREBANK 1 GRUPPEN via its funds 0.29%
FOUR CAPITAL PARTNERS LIMITED via its funds 0.28%
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC via its funds 0.27%
STATE OF CALIFORNIA via its funds 0.27%
MIZUHO FINANCIAL GROUP via its funds 0.25%
SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE via its funds 0.25%
BNP PARIBAS via its funds 0.24%
PETERCAM S.A. via its funds 0.23%
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORPORATION via its funds 0.22%
DIMENSIONAL FUND ADVISORS LP via its funds 0.22%
SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN AB via its funds 0.22%
QUILTER & CO. LTD. via its funds 0.21%
REGERINGSKANSLIET via its funds 0.20%
SMITH & WILLIAMSON HOLDINGS LTD via its funds 0.20%
WEST YORKSHIRE PENSION FUND via its funds 0.20%
ACKERMANS EN VAN HAAREN NV/SA via its funds 0.19%
CONCERNED PARENTS AND TEACHERS OF WYCOCOMAGH AND AREA via its funds 0.19%
INTERNATIONAL CONSOLIDATED AIRLINES GROUP, S. A via its funds 0.19%
AXA, via its funds 0.18%
GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA via its funds 0.18%
RATHBONE BROTHERS PLC via its funds 0.18%
GROUPE CRÉDIT MUTUEL-CIC via its funds 0.17%
STATE OF NEW YORK via its funds US 0.17%
SUMITOMO MITSUI TRUST HOLDINGS, INC via its funds 0.17%
BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA (THE) – SCOTIABANK via its funds 0.16%
JYSKE INVEST FUND MANAGEMENT A/S via its funds 0.16%
PICTET & CIE via its funds 0.16%
ZÜRCHER KANTONALBANK via its funds 0.15%
BUCKLES NICK 0.14%
CORNELIAN ASSET MANAGERS LIMITED via its funds 0.14%
LOMBARD, ODIER, DARIER, HENTSCH & CIE via its funds 0.14%
POLAR CAPITAL HOLDINGS PLC via its funds 0.14%
TEACHERS INSURANCE & ANNUITY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA via its funds 0.14%
CHEVIOT ASSET MANAGEMENT LIMITED via its funds 0.13%
DEXIA via its funds 0.13%
PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC via its funds 0.13%
SPEIRS & JEFFREY LIMITED via its funds 0.13%
TORONTO DOMINION BANK via its funds 0.13%
AZIMUT HOLDING SPA via its funds 0.12%
DNB ASA via its funds 0.12%
DANSKE BANK A/S via its funds 0.11%
IRISH LIFE & PERMANENT GROUP HOLDINGS via its funds 0.11%
NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (THE) via its funds 0.11%
PARTNERS GROUP HOLDING AG via its funds 0.11%
PGGM VERMOGENSBEHEER B.V. via its funds 0.10%
Source

BP Influence/Lobbying

Like most of its fellow oil companies and a number of industry associations, BP was formerly a member of the Global Climate Coalition (GCC): The coalition has heavily lobbied governments and has mounted persuasive advertising campaigns in the US to turn public opinion against concrete action on greenhouse gas emissions. The so called ‘carbon club’ lead the way in undermining public support for action to curb climate change.

BP, attempting to brand itself as progressive was one of the first to withdraw from GCC. John Browne, Chairman of BP, announced in a speech at Stanford University on May 19, 1997, that:

“The time to consider the policy dimensions of climate change is not when the link between greenhouse gases and climate change is conclusively proven, but when the possibility cannot be discounted and is taken seriously by the society of which we are part. We in BP have reached that point.” [112]

In 1998 Shell followed BP and left the coalition and by early 2000 Texaco and others were joining the movement away from the GCC. While the GCC was an overt lobby against action on climate change, since it was sidelined other lobby groups have come to the fore which are more subtle in their tactics.

BP takes a high profile position within the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) [113]. Speeches by John Browne can be found on the WBCSD website [114]. Members of BP wear their WBCSD hat, for example at the UN’s COP climate summits.

For details of WBCSD’s position on climate change: (www.wbcsd.org/projects/pr_climenergy.htm)

BP also belongs to the US Council for International Business (USCIB) [115] The USCIB to which BP America and over 300 other corporations belong is involved in lobbying the US government. The council was founded in 1945 “to promote an open system of world trade, investment and finance” [116]. Other prominent members of the council include: the American Petroleum Institute, Coca-Cola, Chevron (oil Co.), Dupont (see profile), General Electric, General Motors, Ford, McDonalds, Mobil, Monsanto, Nestle USA, Philip Morris (tobacco), Shell (oil), Texaco (oil) and Unilever. The USCIB is the US affiliate of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the International Organization of Employers (IOE). Most significantly USCIB chairs the expert-group of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)[117].

BP also holds positions within the Centre for European Policy Studies [118] (CEPS) [www.ceps.be] Charles Nicholson, Group Senior Adviser of BP, chaired a special meeting on climate change, hosted by CEPS, on the eve of COP6 bis: the resumed international negotiations on the future of the Kyoto Protocol (Bonn, July 16-27, 2000). The meeting launched a new CEPS working party on “Emissions trading and the new EU climate-change policy” which will be chaired by Charles Nicholson [119].

BP’s chief executive officer (CEO) is entitled to sit at the Business Roundtable [120], an association who examine public issues that affect the economy [121]. The association, which represents over 200 companies, ran a series of newspaper advertisements timed to precede an address by President Clinton to its annual meeting in June 1997. The adverts called for a climate policy “balanced” between economy and environment [122]. The roundtable’s position is explained in Rush to Judgment: A Primer on Global Climate Change, available on the group’s website. [ http://www.globalchange.org/gccd/gcc-digest/1997/d97sep17.htm%5D

Global Compact – http://www.unglobalcompact.org A member of the BP board was among the senior officers of 50 major companies present at the formal launch of the UN Global Compact on July 26, 2000. The compact was first mooted by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in a speech to the Davos World Economic Forum in January 1999. The compact between the UN and business aims to uphold values in human rights, labour standards and environmental practice. The Compact is open for adherence by any company, large or small, no formalities are involved but companies are asked to demonstrate their adherence by taking corporate action to support the values of the Compact [123].

The European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), which includes BP is a club of 48 captains of industry drawn from the largest European multinationals. With privileged access to EU and national decision-makers the roundtable has been at the forefront in promoting industry self-regulation over government-enforceable mechanisms. ERT Environment Working Group released a report on climate change in mid-October, prior to COP6 in the Hague: Climate Change: How Government and Industry can Work Together [124].

BP also belongs to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) [125]: “The only representative body that speaks with authority on behalf of enterprises from all sectors in every part of the world.” [126] [www.iccwbo.org]

ICC promotes free trade and the market economy with the conviction that “trade is a powerful force for peace and prosperity” [127]. ICC aims to be a forum where business can agree voluntary rules to govern world trade in the hope that this image of responsible industry self-regulation will persuade governments not to interfere. It proved so successful in this that within a year of the creation of the United Nations, ICC was granted consultative status at the UN [128].

The Corporate Council on Africa (CCA) to which BP belongs [129] was established in 1992 for governments and business, to strengthen commercial relationships between the US and the African continent. CCA members believe that Africa’s future success depends upon the ability of its entrepreneurs and business people to create and retain wealth through private enterprise [130].

Influencing research and education
BP has a working relationship with the following universities. These are key institutions, providing graduates to the oil industry, many courses, particularly in the field of geology receive funding from one or more oil companies: Imperial College, Aberdeen University, Cambridge University, Heriot-Watt University, Oxford University, Warwick University, Kingston University, Lincolnshire and Humberside University. BP recruits heavily from these universities. For more details of the oil industries involvement in higher education see Corporate Watch’s briefing ‘Degrees of Capture’ or contact People & Planet about their ‘Slick Protest’ campaign [www.peopleandplanet.org/climatechange]

Links with government
The strength of BP’s links to Britain’s New-Labour government became apparent within weeks of their election in 1997 when they appointed former chair of BP David Simon (Lord Simon of Highbury) to a position in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) as Minister for Competitiveness in Europe.

BP is represented on a number of government QUANGOs: the Learning & Skills Council, Competition Commission, DTI Advisory Panel on Photovoltaics, Council for Science & Technology, Commonwealth Development Corporation, Scottish Environment Protection Agency, Advice Committee on Business and Environment, Industrial Development Advice Board, Public Services Productivity Committee, Scottish National Heritage, UK Round Table on Sustainable Development, SW Essex Business & Education Partnership, and the Oil and Pipelines Agency.

PR Companies
BP’s advertising agency is Ogilvy & Mather and their PR consultants Ogilvy PR. In the past BP has also used other companies and a number of the trade associations to which it belongs as environmental or community relations consultants.

Greenwash
A key plank of BP’s marketing strategy has been to portray itself as a green company. BP has promoted new ‘cleaner’ fuels and publicised its targets for reducing CO2 emissions from its own operations (eg. by reducing gas flaring), not mentioning its ambitious targets for increased production of fossil fuels. In his introduction to BP’s annual report 2000 John Browne prescribes that for the immediate future hydrocarbons will continue to meet the majority of our energy needs.

BP has further greened its image by being seen to talk with Oxfam and Friends of the Earth, and BP also sponsors cultural institutions including parts of the British Museum, Tate Gallery, Edinburgh Festival Fringe, Museum of Mankind and the National Portrait Gallery.

Perhaps ironically considering BP’s role in climate change, BP employees were involved in raising money for the Mozambique flood appeal [131].

The marketing spin pushed by BP Solar is that “BP Solar is a recognized leader in protecting the environment and believes solar power is a key element to reduce the threat of global climate change and improve air quality.” [132] No mention of BP group’s core business here. In the UK, BP has used TV commercials about rural solar-electrification in the developing world. BP Solar has won multi-million dollar contracts for rural electrification in Indonesia and the Philippines and supplied photovoltaics to the ‘green games’ in Sydney, Australia [133].Source